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Inflation, even at moderate rates, is not innocuos, 
since it is generally associated with erratic variations 
in the level and structure of prices. Nevertheless, if it 
is kept within certain bounds, the economy is able to 
find ways of adapting itself and activity can develop 
without undue uncertainty. 
The nature of the problem changes in situations 
of high inflation, such as those that have affected 
several countries in recent years. In these cases 
economic activity is seriously disturbed. The public 
sector and the private agents shorten the time 
horizon of their decisions; the authorities are 
harassed by the difficulty of administering an almost 
unpredictable economy, while the public makes great 
efforts to safeguard itself against the changes in 
prices or to take advantage of them. When 
speculation becomes rife, it is more likely that the 
measures taken will be mutually inconsistent; the 
abrupt fluctuations in prices also help to aggravate 
social conflicts. The economies subject to this 
turbulence have serious problems in dealing with the 
issues of growth. Thus the control of inflation seems 
to be a sine qua non for the reasonably effective 
functioning of the economic system. 
Few questions have been so much debated, from 
both theoretical and practical angles, as the 
phenomenon of inflation. Nonetheless, the 
controversy persists. The aim of the present article is 
to comment on these debates, indicating some of the 
problems underscored in the analysis of the causes 
and consequences of inflation and in the designing of 
stabilization policies. The last part briefly reviews 
one particular stabilization policy: the Plan Austral 
applied in Argentina since the middle of 1985. 
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I 
The debate on the 
causes of inflation 
1. Statement of the problem 
There have been many controversies on the 
origin of inflation.1 This is due in part to the 
ambiguity of the question itself. In an 
inflationary situation there is a simultaneous, 
though not always equal, rise in the different 
categories of prices, in wages, in the exchange 
rate and in monetary aggregates. What is the 
cause of the rises in the general level of prices? 
The question may refer to issues which are very 
diverse from an analytical standpoint: to the 
immediate determinants of prices (i.e., in 
econometric terminology, to an equation of the 
model in structural form); or to the ultimate 
causes of inflation (i.e., to an equation in a 
reduced form, in which only exogenous variables 
would be taken into account).2 
As regards the first point, there is at present 
no well-established theory on price formation: 
both the equilibrium models and those that 
postulate fixed margins over costs give only an 
imperfect idea of the complexity of the 
functioning of the market. The question is not 
merely academic, because this lack of knowledge 
prevents precise determination of the speed and 
scale of the transfer of cost increases to prices in 
different circumstances, or of the reaction of 
prices to changes in demand. This raises some 
doubts about hypotheses on inflation based on 
very rigid assumptions as to the mechanisms of 
price formation. 
'There are several widely disseminated studies that present a 
picture of the state of theory at different points of time 
(Bronfrenbrenner and Holzman, 1963; Laidler and Parkin, 1975; 
Lipsey, 1981; Frisch, 1983). A comparison of these works clearly 
shows the diversity of the approaches, as well as the changes that 
have taken place in theory in the course of time. 
'The distinction appears in Addison, Burton and Torrance 
(1980). In the models applied the character of the price equation is 
not always clear. For example, an equation that relates prices to 
wages, the exchange rate and the money supply belongs in 
principle neither to the structural form (because the money supply 
can hardly have a direct effect on decisions about prices; at all 
events it will act through its effect on global demand or 
expectations) nor to tbe reduced form (because it does not seem 
that all the independent variables can be treated as exogenous). 
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At all events, decisions on prices depend not 
only on directly observable variables but also on 
the agents' conjectures as to the conduct of 
others. This implies that the more clearly-
defined are individual forecasts, the more 
orderly the variation in prices will be. It also 
seems that the response of prices to a given 
stimulus will depend on the perceptions and 
expectations of those who fix the prices. Above 
all, the pattern of price adjustment will vary 
according to the public's estimation of future 
decisions on economic policy. 
This does not mean that everyone has the 
same perceptions, or that these coincide with the 
"real" mode of action of the authorities or of the 
other agents. Indeed, one of the features of high 
inflation would seem to be the inconsistency of 
expectations. In that case, price-fixing behaviour 
patterns too would be difficult to describe 
systematically. If these vary with the inflationary 
regime, there will probably be no need for a 
precise explanation of the price changes in a 
given régime in order to analyse the transition to 
another (because the change itself would make 
behaviour vary). For example, in considering 
stabilization policies, it would seem to be less 
important to have an idea of the way in which 
prices are fixed in inflation than of the behaviour 
patterns observed once the policies in question 
have been introduced. Of course, there remains 
the problem of recognizing when a change of 
régime has actually taken place. 
In analysing the ultimate determinants of 
inflation, the function of the authorities' 
reaction must likewise be taken into account, 
because, depending on this, certain variables 
might be regarded as exogenous, while others 
(including some policy instruments) would be 
determined as a result of those. But the concept 
of the exogenous is ambiguous, since it depends 
on how far the explanation is to be taken: for 
example, in monetary models it is customary to 
regard the money supply as a datum, but, 
generally speaking, monetary policy will 
probably react (perhaps differently with the 
passage of time) to the fiscal situation, to the 
level of activity, etc.; in turn, an attempt may be 
made to explain the changes in these variables as 
a response to other influences (economic and 
extra-economic), and so forth and so on. This 
gives rise to two symmetrical risks: on the one 
hand, the postulation of simplistic explanations 
(e.g., the assumption that certain instruments 
may be varied at will, when this is not the case); 
and, on the other, the pursuance of the argument 
to a point at which no reasonably precise 
affirmations can be made. 
It is, in the end, a matter of criterion. 
Nevertheless, since inflation can in principle 
arise in different ways, with different 
consequences in each case, it is necessary to 
consider the process that gives rise to price 
increases. This argument can be illustrated by an 
example which has little to do with the inflations 
observed in practice, but which, for that very 
reason, points up a contrast with the theories 
under discussion. 
Let us assume an economy with the 
following characteristics. There is a benchmark 
or reference price, fixed arbitrarily in each 
period; it is immaterial for the exercise whether 
this price is determined by the public sector or by 
some private-sector agent (or group). Each time 
that the price varies individuals receive a 
transfer of money which raises their holdings of 
monetary assets in the same proportion (k) as 
the benchmark price.3 The debts of the public 
sector, if any, and prices controlled by the 
government are also modified proportionately. 
In the last instance, when the price of the 
benchmark product changes, a sort of monetary 
reform occurs; probably the private agents will 
realize that, if all prices are multiplied in the 
proportion k> markets will prove to be in the 
same real situation as before the change. Nor, 
moreover, will pre-existing contracts be affected 
if (as is reasonable to expect in this case) 
individuals include an indexation clause in their 
future payment contracts. In other words, even 
though the general level of prices (determined 
by the benchmark price) may evolve erratically, 
with a rising trend more or less pronounced, 
inflation will have a neutral effect in practice. 
Furthermore, if inflation had these 
(The example (which is suggested by I.eijonhufvud, 1983 b) 
assumes an explicit policy of inactive money. The conclusions 
would be exactly the same if the initiative came from the monetary 
authority. It should be noted, on the other hand, that with the 
hypotheses of the example there is no inflationary tax on stocks of 
money and therefore there is no reason why demand for real 
balances should depend on the variations expected in the 
benchmark price. 
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characteristics, it would be easy to eliminate: it 
would suffice to fix the price of the benchmark 
product once and for all. (No notice is taken here 
of the variations in nominal prices due to 
changes in the relative price of the benchmark 
product. For the merely illustrative purposes of 
the present example, this does not significantly 
affect the argument.) Since no group of agents 
gains or loses as a result of this and since 
presumably prices would immediately be 
adjusted to the fixed benchmark price, the 
measure would not cause resistance or upheaval. 
This elementary example has a negative 
purpose: namely, to show how strict are the 
conditions in which inflation has a well-defined 
cause and innocuous consequences. In fact, in the 
exercise it is postulated that: 
i) Monetary policy is extremely restricted, 
since it is confined to increasing the money 
supply, with all due notice, in the same 
proportion as the price of the benchmark 
product; 
ii) Fiscal policy is also subject to a major 
restriction: it has no access to monetary 
financing except to make transfers in proportion 
to cash holdings. In other words, there can be no 
deficit financed by a money issue over and above 
these transfers; 
iii) Prices regulated by the government 
(public service tariffs, exchange rate) must rise 
in line with other prices; 
iv) Workers and firms are accurately 
acquainted with the functioning of the system, 
adapt their behaviour to that knowledge and rely 
upon other agents' doing the same. This implies, 
in particular, that there has been a previous 
learning period which has led to the adjustment 
of decisions on prices and of ways of drawing up 
contracts; 
v) Given these assumptions, the origin of 
price variations can be found, straightforwardly 
enough, in the price of the benchmark product. 
There is no specific motivation, however, for 
this inflation: the authority that fixes the 
reference price at any given time has no 
particular interest in whether it has this or that 
value. 
None of these conditions is fulfilled in 
practice. Inflationary processes appear to be due 
to a complicated interplay of action and reaction 
between economic policy and the different parts 
of the private sector, which cannot be 
represented in the simple and well-defined 
terms of the foregoing exercise. At all events, to 
try to understand this interplay, and the 
persistent rise in prices that ensues, it is 
necessary to introduce simplifying assumptions. 
Several types of general hypotheses on the 
origin of inflation have been proposed, differing 
with respect to price formation mechanisms and 
to the direction of the causality they postulate 
between prices, wages and money. 
2. Monetary-fiscal theories 
According to the most traditional concept, 
inflation is always and everywhere a monetary 
phenomenon (Friedman, 1968). Monetarism 
today differs from the former construct of 
simple quantitative theory and of demand 
inflation models (in which inflation was 
associated with conditions approaching full 
utilization of capacity): the theory does not 
postulate a necessarily close relationship, period 
by period, between money and prices, since it 
admits various anticipations or lags and also 
rationalizes situations of price acceleration with 
simultaneous declines in activity. But these 
effects would be explicable, in any case, as 
resulting from changes in the money supply. 
Monetarism is, in the first place, a 
methodological position: the level of prices is 
analysed through money supply and demand. 
Secondly, traditional monetarism considers the 
money supply as an exogenous variable, which 
regulates global demand4 and, through this, real 
output and prices.5 
In the most typical simple model, demand 
for money is expressed as a stable function of 
nominal income and the rate of interest, which, 
in turn, is equivalent to the sum of the real 
"• Except where otherwise stated, the terms "global demand", 
"aggregate demand" and "demand for goods" are used here to 
designate a variable that defines the position of a demand curve 
(i.e., they refer tu the function that determines the ratio between 
prices and global quantities). This can be approximately 
assimilated to nominal income. An increase in global demand, 
defined in this way, is compatible with a variation, either positive 
or negative, in quantities of output. 
5The conventional analysis can be extended to include 
monetary régimes in which the money supply is an endogenous 
variable. A case in point would be the monetary model of open 
economies with a fixed exchange rate, which is discussed later. 
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interest rate (assumed to be more or less 
constant) and the anticipated inflation. A global 
supply function is postulated, which links output 
with current prices and expected prices.6 These 
depend on the evolution of the money supply, or, 
at all events, on price trends in the past.7 Output 
and the general level of prices in the current 
period are simultaneously determined, 
therefore, by the present value and the expected 
value of the money supply.8 
The theory has two components: the 
association between money and prices, on the 
one hand, and the hypothesis of the exogenous 
nature of the money supply, on the other. 
Respecting the first point, a distinction can be 
made between the closed-economy monetary 
models and those of an open economy. In the 
closed-economy models prices respond to the 
conditions prevailing in the domestic markets, 
which, in their turn, would be governed as a 
whole by the money supppiy. The open economy 
models (Frenkel & Johnson, 1976 and 1978) are 
based on the single-price rule for tradeable 
goods: the trade-off between purchases or sales 
in the country and abroad would cause prices to 
be governed by international prices and the 
exchange rate (once the effects of taxes on 
external trade had been discounted). In the 
simplest hypothesis, the level of prices is directly 
determined by the condition of parity of 
purchasing power; generally speaking, it is 
recognized that the real exchange rate can vary 
owing to relative price changes as between 
tradeable and non-tradeable goods. The more 
open the economy (in the sense that the share of 
tradeable goods is greater), the closer will be the 
linkage between domestic prices and the 
exchange rate. The way in which money and 
prices are associated will depend on the 
*See Friedman < 1974), Lucas ( 1973 and 1981), Cagan ( 1956) 
replaces the supply curve by the assumption that the quantities 
produced are constant. 
'The difference in assumptions on formation of expectations 
among the authors who accept the monetary interpretation of 
inflation is reflected in different attitudes towards stabilization 
policies. For the purposes of the present discussion this difference 
is not essential. 
8The monetary model recognizes that the exogenous 
variations in the supply of goods (caused, for example, by random 
changes in primary production) can affect price levels. However, a 
distinction is also drawn between once-for-all changes in prices 
and their persistent increase; the latter would have a monetary 
origin. 
international payments regime. With a floating 
exchange rate the money supply will affect 
prices (through its effect on the value of foreign 
exchange in local currency), whereas with a 
pegged exchange rate (when there is parity of 
purchasing power), the causality, moment by 
moment, will be reversed.9 Nevertheless, 
whether the exchange rate floats or is handled as 
an instrument of economic policy, the trend of 
prices will be determined by the money creation 
of domestic origin.10 
Writers differ in their positions regarding 
the supposed exogenous character of the money 
supply (or of domestic credit, if an open 
economy model is applied). For some, the 
monetary authorities can regulate the volume of 
their domestic assets. Others, on the contrary, 
contend that this capacity is small: even if a close 
relationship exists between money and prices, it 
is not monetary but fiscal policy that will 
determine the rate of inflation. These authors 
point out that the financing of the government 
limits the autonomy of monetary policy: the 
public-sector deficit can be temporarily covered 
by securities against the debt, but, if funds are not 
generated to service this debt, in the last resort it 
will have to be monetized. In other words, the 
fiscal deficit has repercussions on the money 
supply, whose increase determines that of 
prices.11 
5
 Writers do not agree on the capacity assigned to the Central 
Bank to sterilize reserve flows; i.e., to control the money supply in 
the short run by fixed exchange rates (Darby, 1980). 
'"The connection between domestic credit and prices would 
be more indirect with a fixed exchange rate, especially if there were 
marked capital mobility, because the variations in international 
reserves would offset those occurring in the Central Bank's 
internal assets, so that the latter would have little effect on the 
money supply and prices. Nevertheless, the monetary models 
emphasize that this independence is limited; in the long run. the 
exchange rate must vary at the same rate as domestic credit 
(because, if not, the flows of reserves would become insupportably 
great), so that this latter regulates the average value of the rate of 
inflation (Rodriguez, 1979). 
"See Sargent and Wallace (1981); for the Argentinian case: 
Cavallo and Peña (1983). In the original argument, there is no 
essential linkage from period to period between deficit and prices: 
it is not the temporary but the permanent credit requirements that 
will cause inflation. The fiscalist position is sometimes expressed 
as an assumption that prices grow in proportion to the public debt 
¡n a broad sense (i.e., including both money and other assets that 
produce interest). This point of view ignores the possibility of 
changes in demand for assets, and it is assumed that an open-
market operation (which replaces one form of debt by another) 
would be irrelevant, which is not obvious. 
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Analysis of the determination of the money 
supply has recently been extended in an attempt 
to represent the interaction between the 
behaviour of the monetary authorities on the 
one hand, and that of the public or of other 
sections of the government, on the other. The 
following would be an example of these 
models.12 The economy ¡s represented by a 
Phillips curve amplified by expectations: if 
global demand (which depends solely on the 
money supply) grows at the pace predicted, 
prices are adjusted in the samé proportion and 
output remains at its equilibrium value; 
unexpected increases in demand give rise for a 
time to greater activity, while prices react less 
than proportionally to the variation in 
expenditure. Individuals know this and 
incorporate the datum into their price 
expectations; they are also informed as to the 
hehaviour of the economic authority, whose 
measures give preference to conditions of low 
inflation and high output. Below a certain level 
of inflation, the authorities are willing to 
increase demand if this implies greater activity; 
beyond that point they consider a decline in the 
real product acceptable in exchange for a lower 
inflation rate. There is consequently an 
equilibrium which consists in maintaining the 
rate of inflation at that critical figure, since any 
other situation would be unstable; if, for 
example, the rise in prices were lower than that 
figure, the public would expect the government 
to try to raise global demand, and would adjust 
their expectations accordingly. Only at the 
critical point of the inflation rate are the 
government and the public without incentives to 
change their behaviour. 
It will be seen that, in this model, the rate of 
inflation is determined, in the last analysis, by 
the preferences of the authorities (one of the 
weaknesses of models of this type is that they do 
not define how these preferences are formed and 
how they come to be known by the public), and 
u\n the tase mentioned in the text (which derives from te 
models of Thompson (1981) and Barm and Gordon (1983) the 
interplay takes place between the Central Bank and the private 
sector as a whole. Models have also been proposed which aim at 
describing the interaction between the Central Bank and the wage-
earners {Gale, 1981; Horn and Persson, 1984) or the fiscal 
authorities (Tabellini, 1985). 
the parameters of the economy, particularly 
quantity-price elasticities over the short term. In 
other words, although the hypothesis of a 
relatively simple association between money and 
prices is maintained, an exogenous explanation 
is sought for the changes in the money supply, so 
that the cause of inflation is identified with the 
determinants of this supply. 
The models of this type are of obvious 
interest, since they show how the rate of 
inflation depends on the nature of the responses 
that the evolution of the economy evokes in the 
authorities, and vice versa. They also lead to 
conclusions that are useful for the discussion of 
stabilization policies: to a large extent, a 
sustained change in the inflation rate may be 
seen as a modification of the game that 
determines price increases. In contrast, these 
models also demonstrate the complexity of the 
analysis, even when it is based on clearly-defined 
assumptions as to behaviour. Inasmuch as they 
are based on relatively simple games and impose 
conditions of equilibrium and rational 
expectations, the models probably give an 
oversystematic interpretation of the inflationary 
process. Both from the standpoint of the study of 
causality and from that of the description of 
price formation mechanisms, the monetary and 
fiscal models leave problems unresolved. 
In point of fact, the association between 
money and prices seems difficult to reduce to a 
simple formula. In a sense, the monetary models 
do not offer an independent explanation of 
prices: these would be deduced residually from 
the money supply and the other determinants of 
demand for money. Between changes in the 
money supply and in prices there is an implicit 
sequence of effects, passing through global 
demand and the public's expectations with 
respect to this, which is not described precisely. 
To begin with, the very concept of money is not 
defined with exactitude: there is a variety of 
assets, each of which has its own yield and its 
own characteristics in respect of risk, greater or 
lesser ease of transfer, etc. In principle, the 
supply of each of these assets affects demand for 
the rest and demand for goods, through changes 
in its explicit returns and in the liquidity services 
that it offers. Hence, the financial determinants 
of global demand would consist in a vector of 
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assets rather than in a single aggregate.li Indeed, 
it would seem that the relation between nominal 
income and the money supply cannot be 
represented in general as a simple function of 
the interest rate.14 Besides, as is generally 
recognized, the public's disposition to keep 
money in their hands depends on predictions 
which, if the monetary theory with rational 
expectations is not literally adhered to, may be 
an autonomous source of changes in demand for 
goods in relation to given M. Moreover, it seems 
evident that real shocks can affect expenditure. 
In brief, the relation between money and 
demand is not automatic. 
Furthermore, there has still been no clear 
answer to the problem of the reaction of prices 
to present or predicted changes in expenditure. 
In the typical monetary equilibrium model, the 
equation between money supply and demand is 
combined with an aggregate supply curve, 
according to which output responds to 
unexpected changes in expenditure.15 This 
implies the adoption of highly categorical 
hypotheses, both on the formation of 
expectations and on the operation of the 
markets. From this latter standpoint, it is 
frequently left unclear whether the effect of 
demand on prices would occur directly or 
through the price of the factors of production. 
On the other hand, the hypothesis of price 
flexibility (subject to information on the current 
11
 Tobin (1974) in his comments on Friedman, has insisted on 
the non-neutrality of money owing to the existence of various 
assets in the public's portfolio. 
"The development of models of demand for money with 
partial adjustment (Chow, 1966) or with the hypothesis of 
cushioning of shocks (Carr and Darby, 1981 ), in which demand for 
real cash balances approximates only gradually to that which 
results from the classic demand functions, indirectly reveals the 
difficulties of linking, period by period, the movements of the 
money supply and of global demand. 
"In other words, the prices observed in a period are equal to 
the prices expected (or to the estimation of the general level of 
prices that people formulate at the time, with incomplete 
information) plus a correction that depends on the deviation of 
real output from its "normal" value. There are other possible 
hypotheses on price formation compatible with a money-prices 
causality; ¡n particular this is in keeping with assumptions of a 
fixed margin over costs. Alchian and Allen (1964) present an 
analysis of this type, according to which an increase ¡n expenditure 
acts first on the prices of productive resources with a relatively 
inelastic supply, and repercussions on the prices of the other goods 
and services then ensue. This model, however, leaves the 
explanation of how factor prices are determined pretty much in the 
air. 
state of the economy) gives rise to certain 
questions. Many interchanges seem to have a 
contractual character (explicit or not), which 
implies slow price reactions to changes in 
demand. These rigidities are probably not 
mechanical, but would depend on conditions in 
the economy and on the agents' conjectures on 
the subject. There has not yet been any thorough 
study of the rules of decision-making that would 
result in the fixing of prices; the assumption of 
equilibrium, however, is no more reasonable 
than that of complete rigidity.16 
It would seem, therefore, that a purely 
monetary analysis does not answer the question 
as to the cause of inflation and can hardly 
describe the movements of prices from one 
period to another. Nevertheless, as the growth 
of the money supply is a typical component of 
inflation, any theory should take the monetary 
aspect of the phenomenon into account. At the 
same time, if the economic authority reserves 
the right to issue non-interest-bearing assets, all 
inflation accompanied by increases in the money 
supply will have a fiscal component.17 In other 
words, a complete description of inflation must 
consider why the inflation tax is collected and 
how it is used. This almost inevitably leads to 
questions of a social and political nature: when 
certain limits have been exceeded, financing 
l6This analysis is valid in principle for closed economy 
models. However, neither does the hypothesis of parity of 
purchasing power seem to be clearly demonstrated in the case of 
open economies, not only because of the existence of non-tradeable 
goods, but also because the single-price law is not strictly applied to 
many goods that play their part in trade (Machinea, 1983). Here 
also, therefore, it is essential to use hypotheses of behaviour 
regarding the determination of domestic prices. The current 
equilibrium models make the general level of prices depend on the 
exchange rate and global expenditure {because of their effect on 
the markets for non-tradeable goods); thus the same observations 
apply as in the case of closed economy equilibrium models. 
"This is valid even if the inflation has a real origin. Consider, 
for example, a system with a fixed exchange rate (for the sake of 
simplicity ¡t is assumed that the external prices of tradeable goods 
are also fixed), where technical progress is greater in the industries 
linked with the external market than in those producing non-
tradeable goods (Aukrust, 1977). The relative price of the non-
tradeable goods increases over time; this in itself implies a rising 
trend in the general level of prices. The demand for money also 
increases. If the Central Bank does not modify credit to the 
government, ¡t accumulates assets against the rest of the world or 
against the domestic private sector, which can be interpreted as a 
use of the inflation tax to augment the net assets of the public-
sector. If at some point the public sector decides to make use of 
these funds, it will have a spending power which is not the 
counterpart of tax revenues. 
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through a currency issue indicates that the 
government is forced to use a somewhat 
haphazard method of resolving the discrepancy 
between its capacity to obtain resources and the 
pressures that determine its expenditure. 
Reciprocally, to achieve a steady fall in the 
inflation rate the public sector must at some 
point renounce part of the credit it obtains from 
the Central Bank:18 this implies losses for certain 
groups against benefits for those most affected 
by the inflation tax. 
3. Models based on the distribution struggle 
According to the monetary or fiscal theories, 
inflation results in the last resort from increases 
in nominal expenditure induced by the economic 
policy pursued. Another explanation associates 
inflation with persistent rises in production 
costs. This relationship can be understood, in the 
first place, with reference to the way in which 
prices are fixed: the theory would then be 
identified with the assumption that the prices of 
goods are directly determined by factor prices. 
Nonetheless, although there is clearly a close 
connection between costs and prices, this still 
does not define the cause of inflation: it is 
necessary to explain how these costs are 
established and what is the set of exogenous 
variables that determines the price system. 
In distribution struggle models, prices are 
established as the result of a social conflict 
(Kalecki, 1943; Aujac, 1954;Jackson and Turner, 
1975; Moore, 1979). Competition among social 
groups is manifested in fiscal policy. As 
mentioned above, the existence of high and 
persistent deficits might generally be regarded 
as reflecting the difficulty of reconciling the 
demands of public expenditure with resistance 
against taxation. The models discussed here 
focus on another aspect of the distribution 
question. It is clear that changes in relative prices 
'"The reduction in the deficit financed by issue need nut be 
simultaneous with the fall in the inflation rate, because with the 
fall in the rate of price increases there will presumably be a rise in 
demand for money. The argument in the text ignores the 
possibility (theoretically conceivable) that inflation has exceeded 
the level that maximizes the inflation tax; i.e., that the rise in prices 
is such that an additional increment in the inflation rate will 
produce a more than proportional decrease in holdings of real cash 
balances. It does not appear that this possibility is of practical 
importance, except perhaps in cases of hyperinflation. 
have effects on distribution: the suppliers of a 
product, or productive resource, benefit if their 
sales price increases in relation to the rest (and 
the amounts sold are not too much reduced). In 
traditional equilibrium analysis, prices (and the 
resulting distribution) derive from the operation 
of the markets, in competitive conditions. 
According to other theories, some basic prices, 
such as wages, are determined by the action of 
social groups. The attempts of the various 
groups to improve their real income would give 
rise to increases in costs and prices (since each 
group can only influence its own price); in some 
periods wages would be in the lead and in others 
the prices of the different categories of goods, 
according to the relative power of workers and 
entrepreneurs.19 The sequence of actions and 
reactions of these groups would bring with it 
inflation. In other words, inflation would result 
from a collective interplay in which wages and 
margins over costs are determined without 
equilibrium being reached. The more intense the 
conflict, the faster will prices rise, that is, if the 
groups simultaneously try to obtain marked 
improvements in their real income.20 Moreover, 
if there are indexing instruments (defined 
institutionally or applied as implicit rules), the 
price variation in one period will be transferred 
to subsequent periods: an exacerbation of the 
distribution struggle would produce not only a 
rapid rise in prices but also a persistent increase 
in inflation. 
To complete the model the behaviour of 
monetary policy would need to be defined. Given 
the assumption that prices and wages respond 
m a i n l y t o c o s t s and d i s t r i b u t i o n a l 
considerations, the conflict would confront the 
authorities with an awkward dilemma. A 
l
''In the case of Argentina, three broad groups are 
traditionally distinguished (workers, urban entrepreneurs, 
agricultural entrepreneurs) which, in varying alliances according 
to the moment, would define the characteristics of the conflict. 
According to these studies, the bargaining capacity of the groups 
and the structure of prices would be particularly influenced by the 
external payments situation (see, among others, Ferrer (1963); 
Brodersohn (1974); Canitrot (1975); Mallon and Sourrouille 
(1975). 
HIOt when there are pressures to obtain an increase in the 
relative prices of some products with flexible prices, which 
generate resistance to the fall in the real income of the groups 
affected. In this context, moreover, the government might also 
initiate or accelerate the sectoral struggle by applying policies 
aimed at increasing the real value of the prices it controls. 
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restriction of demand would have an effect on 
the amounts produced and only very gradually 
on prices. Prices and wages can respond to 
expectations, but these last would not be based 
on announcements of monetary policy as in 
e q u i l i b r i u m mode l s p o s i t i n g r a t i o n a l 
expectations. Thus, when a rise in prices occurs, 
the options for the government would be either 
to confirm the rise by expanding global demand 
or else to accept a decline in activity. From the 
standpoint of these models, monetary policy is 
generally endogenous; the level of prices is 
"decided" by private groups or individuals and 
the government adjusts its conduct (though not 
necessarily immediately) to this decision.21 In 
other words, distribution struggle theories are 
associated with a hypothesis on the economic 
policy régime which postulates that government 
action follows in the wake of the private sector, 
in opposition to the monetary and fiscal 
hypotheses which assign the leadership to the 
authorities. 
T h e hypotheses summar ized above 
highlight the distributive aspect of price and 
wage variations, which is obscured in 
equilibrium models. They also underline the 
limitations of traditional analyses in describing 
the relations between firms and workers: 
production generates quasi-profits, whose 
distribution is a matter of bargaining, especially 
in the case of short-time horizons. At all events, 
distribution-struggle models frequently fail to 
clarify the hypotheses of behaviour which would 
explain the conduct of groups and individuals 
(Hirschman, 1985). This poses a number of 
interrogatives. Even if nominal wages are 
established for a group of enterprises (or for the 
economy as a whole), in principle each firm 
determines its prices individually: real wages, 
therefore, are not the result of collective 
bargaining. How are the strategies of the 
different parties determined when wages are 
settled, and how are prices established once costs 
are known? In any case, it seems to involve a 
complicated game, in which the participants 
2lThe money supply might also vary with an endogenous 
response of the fiscal deficit to prices owing to the existence of lags 
in the collection of taxes (Olivera, 1967; Dutton, 1971; Tanzi, 
1977; Canavese, 1985). In this case, a once-for-all increase in prices 
might give rise to a persistent acceleration of the growth of the 
money supply. 
have to act on the basis of conjectures as to the 
measures likely to be taken by the other agents 
and by economic policy, without much precise 
knowledge of what will happen in the end. In 
view of the complexity of the problem it is 
probable that rules of behaviour are adopted 
which do not incorporate all the information 
potentially available (since that information is 
not necessarily reliable and since it is difficult to 
draw inferences on the basis of the data).22 But it 
is still a moot question how mechanically such 
rules will be applied as the transfer of costs to 
prices or the increasing of wages on the basis of 
past inflation, and how these rules will be 
adjusted in face of abrupt changes in 
circumstances, produced, for example, by a 
modification in the economic policy régime.23 
The impression derived from the hypothesis 
of a price-wage spiral is that of an economy 
which does not succeed in determining a fairly 
stable set of relative prices: if a group wishes to 
improve its relative situation, its action is 
neutralized after a time by the reaction of other 
prices, so that the succession of moves does not 
achieve a well-defined result. An immediate 
question is: how does the inconsistency in the 
price system arise?2,1 An initial possibility 
appears if some group attempts to take 
advantage of lags in price adjustment to obtain a 
temporary improvement in its real income; in 
the short run, demands are relatively inelastic, 
and, although the action of the said group may be 
counteracted at some moment by a rise in other 
prices, there may at any rate be a potential gain. 
This line of conduct calls for several conditions: 
co-ordinated action (more easily sustainable 
over short terms), the absence of anticipatory 
reactions on the part of other agents; and a not 
very vigorous response as regards the quantities 
demanded. This last appears the more probable, 
"Okun (1981) discusses the problems associated with price 
formation and attempts to rationalize the existence of rigidities. 
Frenkel (1984a) contends that wages respond to institutional 
conditions and that if these conditions are established, the 
resulting indexation of past inflation is a system that saves the 
parties the labour of procuring and processing information. 
2JFrenkel (1983) points out that the margin over costs 
applied by firms would not remain fixed in face of such changes. 
"This refers to the case in which ir is assumed that the 
distribution struggle initiates the acceleration of price increases. It 
should be noted that this case is different from that which results 
from the defensive reactions produced when wages and prices vary 
in order to adapt to an already rampant inflation. 
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the more erratic is the movement of overall 
prices. Thus, in conditions of already manifest 
instability more frequent price rises of this type 
can be expected. 
A second form of distribution struggle may 
occur if prices and wages are established in an 
e x p e c t a t i o n o f p e r m a n e n t r e l a t i v e 
improvements, which is later disappointed. This 
would happen, for example, if the real wage 
envisaged by the workers became incompatible 
with the profit margin policy of the firms. The 
quest for a viable system of relative prices may 
give rise to successive increases in wages and 
prices. In a situation of this type the struggle 
would be a symptom not only of social tension 
but also of economic imbalance. These 
incongruities seem more likely to occur when 
some exogenous factor distorts relative prices or 
reduces real income. The real wages demanded 
and the margins over costs presumably depend 
on the estimates made on the basis of normal 
values, sus ta inable in accordance with 
experience. Although it may be recognized that 
there has been a change which diminishes global 
income, its repercussions on prices and 
remunerations as regards particular groups may 
not be easy to establish in advance. There is no 
guarantee that the incomes hoped for will be 
equivalent to potential income. Attempts to 
maintain relative prices that were normal in the 
past may push nominal values above ordinary 
levels. In other words, the learning process 
which leads to a new price system would 
accompany the effective appearance of surplus 
supply or demand on the markets, and would 
imply a rise in prices as a whole. 
At all events, although the distribution 
struggle may be an autonomous source of price 
increases, it is obvious that this inflationary 
mechanism would function the more intensely, 
the more flexible was economic policy. Although 
it is true that acute distribution conflicts hamper 
the regulation of nominal demand, it is no less 
certain that a purely passive policy has an 
evident bias towards inflation. In setting prices, 
each individual or group will take it into account 
that, if the rest determine a higher inflation rate, 
demand will grow as a result. An upsurge of 
some prices, or a threat that this will happen, 
will therefore cause reactions in the other prices. 
Hence it is probable that inflation will 
accelerate. The limit would be reached when 
price increases attained a rate which the 
authorities were not disposed to support. This 
would mean that economic policy could not 
escape the implicit dilemma; there must be a 
point at which the unconditional maintenance of 
activity will be renounced in order to avoid 
bigger price increases. 
4. Structura/ inflation models 
The term "structural" is ambiguous. Both the 
mechanisms of price formation and the stimuli 
that in the last instance act on them depend on 
the specific features of the economy, on its social 
composition and on the way in which economic 
policy is determined. A high and persistent fiscal 
deficit, for example, can undoubtedly be 
attributed to structural causes, if this is the term 
used for the group of pressures by which it is 
originated. Structural inflation hypotheses, 
however, refer to a specific class of models, with 
well-defined assumptions as to the non-
monetary origin of inflation (Sunkel, 1958; 
Prebisch, 1961; Seers, 196$ and 1964; Ruggles, 
1964; Olivera, 1964; Frisch, 1983, chapter 5). 
According to the distribution struggle 
hypothesis, inflation is symptomatic of a 
maladjustment in the determination of relative 
prices. In contrast, for some models inflation can 
be interpreted as a mechanism that facilitates 
the establishment of relative equilibrium prices 
when there is variation in sectoral supply and 
demand. In the event of downward rigidity of 
nominal prices,25 it is impossible to achieve a 
balance by keeping the general level of prices 
fixed: there are no forces tending to eliminate 
excess supply of those goods whose relative price 
should decrease. In contrast, if global demand 
increases at least to the point at which the 
nominal prices of these goods remain fixed 
(which implies that the other prices rise) the 
constraint caused by rigidity can be avoided. In 
other words, when changes occur in technology, 
in preferences, etc., which would require a 
modification of relative prices, this can occur 
" A distinction is frequently made among goods according to 
the degree of excess demand-elasticity in their prices. In some 
cases, the response would be relatively rapid; in others it would 
occur very slowly (Hicks, 1974). 
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without distortions only if certain nominal 
prices are not forced downward. If the 
authorities adopt a policy of maintaining output 
volume, the result is a rising trend in prices as a 
whole. The greater is the frequency and the 
larger the scale of intersectoral transfusions, and 
the more inelastic is sectoral supply and demand, 
the more severe will inflation be; this depends 
on the structure of the economy. From this 
viewpoint, therefore, the chain of causality 
would extend from the variation of relative 
prices —due to real factors— to inflation, 
through a régime of lais ser-faire policy, which 
permits a price slide in order to facilitate the 
transition from one set of prices and quantities 
to another. 
These theor ies indicate that some 
generalized price increases do not necessarily 
derive from global variations in supply and 
demand, but may also originate in shifts between 
sectors. Although the argument is based-on a 
very schematic theory of price formation (ancT 
the downward rigidity of nominal prices seems 
to lose importance as inflation rises), it is 
evident that in many markets equilibrating price 
responses occur only slowly. In the case of some 
goods, the initial reaction to an excess of supply 
is a reduction of the quantities produced, 
whereas in respect of others (such as agricultural 
products) there are more pronounced price 
adjustments. Consequently, it is probable that an 
increase in the relative prices of the second 
group of articles will lead to a rise in the general 
level of nominal prices; these increments may be 
transmitted in due course if there is a diffusion 
mechanism (such as indexation rules or induced 
changes in the fiscal deficit) or if the prospect of 
reduced activity leads the authorities to ratify the 
increases. 
In the initial expositions of the structural 
inflation hypothesis emphasis was laid on the 
inelasticity of agricultural supply, which was 
attributed to technological and institutional 
rigidities and to inflexibility in respect of a 
reduction of nominal prices. A group of more 
recent studies (Canavese, 1982; Frenkel, 1983 
and 1984a; Lopes, 1984; and L. Taylor, 1983, 
chap. 6, 10) also adopts a non-monetary 
conception of inflation, but with different 
characteristics. T h e hypotheses on price 
formation have two main elements. In the first 
place, goods are divided into two classes: those 
with flexible prices (typically, raw materials) 
and those with 'managed' prices; the prices of 
the latter would be determined by the 
application of relatively constant margins over 
costs. Secondly, it is assumed that wages follow 
an indexation rule based on the variation of 
prices in former periods, and are little influenced 
by predictions of future prices and excess 
demand for labour.26 Hence the rate of inflation 
has a pronounced component inertia, since the 
indexation of wages transmits price increases 
into the future;27 upswings in inflation would be 
mainly due to increases in the relative values of 
the goods with flexible prices.28 It can also be 
deduced that real wages would vary in inverse 
proportion to the inflation rate and that the 
changes in global demand would bring their 
effects to bear almost entirely on the amounts 
produced and very little on prices. 
From the analytical standpoint, these 
models show how difficult it is, with the 
equilibrium approach, to explain price 
formation and especially wage formation. In the 
first place, they call in question the implicit 
assumption of instantaneous wage-setting: 
labour relations tend to be long-lasting and their 
renegotiation costly; wages would therefore 
form part of a contract (perhaps implicit) which 
is not constantly reviewed. Hence nominal 
wages would show appreciable rigidity over 
short periods. Furthermore, attention is drawn 
to the costs in terms of information and conflict 
that would be implied by complex wage 
regulations, using data which are not generally 
available or easy to obtain (Frenkel, 1984b). 
From this standpoint indexation in respect of 
past inflation would be, in a context of rapid 
price rises, a reasonable method of stabilizing 
26This type of model can be combined with rhe distribution 
struggle hypotheses through episodic changes in the margin over 
costs or in the degree of indexation of wages. 
¿'Inflationary inertia has also been emphasized by Gordon 
(1981) and Tobin (1980). Fisher (1977), Phelps and J, Taylor 
(1977 and 1980), among others, have discussed the effects of 
contractual rigidities, although, in the models in question, wages 
are determined on the basis of forecasts. 
;8This conclusion is similar to that of the traditional 
structuralist model. In the latter, however, an attempt was made to 
explain price increases, whereas here the analysis refers to changes 
in the inflation rate. Moreover, recent models differ from that of 
Olivera ( 1964) ¡n that no reference is made to general equilibrium. 
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labour relations, without resorting to procedures 
inapplicable in practice. For this reason, wages 
would be set with retrospective criteria, as a 
function of the price changes taking place 
between occasions of adjustment, and not on the 
basis of expectations concerning future inflation. 
Wage indexation is current practice in 
inflationary economies; it facilitates the 
fulfilment of contracts in conditions of rapid 
price variation and is a relatively inexpensive 
formula to negotiate and apply. Obviously, in an 
economy in which indexation is widespread, 
inflation presents an inertia which is a particular 
obstacle to the application of stabilization 
policies based exclusively on restriction of 
demand. 
Some questions, however, remain to be 
answered. When nominal wages are fixed, one of 
the main variables taken into account is the rise 
in prices since the preceding adjustment. But the 
indexation system based on past inflation is 
imperfect, since it fails to maintain the 
purchasing power of the contract if the price 
trend is modified, nor does it incorporate other 
real influences on wages. It would be of interest 
to specify in what conditions indexation is used 
as a means of avoiding frequent renegotiations, 
and how and with what frequency the wage base 
is reviewed. To do this, it would be necessary to 
define with some precision the objectives of the 
parties, their attitudes and the costs of 
negotiation and application of different types of 
contract, in addition to the institutional 
context.29 The theory has not yet been clarified 
on this point: the current models have reached 
firm conclusions, although various hypotheses 
have been put forward which would account for a 
certain rigidity in wages.50 In particular, it 
remains to explain the existence of different 
ways of drawing up contracts according to the 
economy and the period in question (wages fixed 
in nominal terms with adjustments varying in 
2yThe importance of institutional conditions has been 
underlined, among others, by Cortázar (1983) and Frenkel 
(1984a). The latter author avers that wages theory is necessarily 
historical and that it is not possible to formulate an explanation of 
a general type. 
i0For a summary of the current discussion on the theory of 
contracts and price- and wage-fixing, see Azariadis and Cooper 
(1985), Azariadis and Stiglitz (1983), Flanagan (1984), Klein 
(1984), Lazear (1984), Weitzman (1984) and Yellen (1984). 
frequency, more or less complete indexation 
subject to price indexes or other variables, with 
different lags and adjustment periods) and, 
above all, the transition from one mode of 
procedure to another.*1 In this connection, it 
would seem that methods of wage (and price) 
fixing depend on the economic policy régime. In 
particular, indexation with a retrospective 
criterion stabilizes the real wage expected, if the 
past rate of inflation is a good indicator of that 
which will prevail in the period covered by the 
contract. The fulfilment of this condition will 
depend on the anticipated behaviour of the 
prices fixed in the public sector and on the 
monetary aggregates (through their effect on 
flexible prices, margins over costs or the actual 
expectations of other sectors). Although it is a 
fact that the costs of transaction might account 
for the continuance of certain rules even though 
they imply a margin of error, it is no less true 
that methods based exclusively on the 
extrapolation of past behaviour patterns will 
probably not be applied at moments of visible 
change in economic conditions. In other words, 
it would prove impossible for a theory of prices 
and wages to omit consideration of expectations 
(that is, prices, in the last instance, are fixed 
prospectively) and this would reintroduce (albeit 
at moments of pronounced variations) global 
demand into the explanation of 'managed' 
prices. In any case, since it is very probable that 
the response of flexible prices and of 
expectations to demand may be neither 
complete nor uniform, and renegotiation has its 
costs, the presence of contractual rigidities will 
be an important element in the analysis of 
stabilization policies. 
5. Summary 
The debate on the causes of inflation is often 
presented in terms of an option between 
different typologies: inflation would appear to 
have a well-defined nature that would need to be 
>lA particularly interesting topic is that of the speed with 
which the rules for price and wage formation adapt themselves to 
the current rate of inflation. Gerchunoff (1985) comments that, 
after the German stabilization of 1923, wages were once again 
fixed in nominal terms (in local currency) with considerable 
promptitude, but their period of validity remained for many years 
shorter than that observable in other European countries. 
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discovered. This attitude is not absurd from an 
analytical point of view; besides, a precise 
explanation of inflation would assist the design 
of policies. It happens at times, however, that 
t h e d i s cus s ion a s s u m e s a s o m e w h a t 
methodological aspect: while some demand an 
explanation of the creation of money and its 
effects, for example, others insist on taking wage 
variation into account. In point of fact, a 
reasonable complete theory should incorporate 
all these issues at one and the same time, so as to 
identify exogenous influences and show the 
mechanisms by which they are transmitted to 
prices. There is no theory sufficiently developed 
to permit precise inferences of this type. 
Single-cause explanations have their 
dangers. It is true, for instance, that there are no 
cases of sustained inflation in which there has 
not been a rapid increase in the money supply. It 
also seems clear that predictions on the 
behaviour of monetary policy play a part in the 
formation of prices: these last will be the more 
volatile and resistant to downward movements, 
the greater the likelihood that global demand 
will adjust itself passively to prices. But these 
observations do not explain inflation. A purely 
monetary model oversimplifies decisions on 
prices (in assuming that these are determined 
according to an equilibrium in which the agents 
take into account only the predicted evolution of 
the money supply) and leaves unanswered the 
question as to the nature of the pressures that act 
on monetary policy. In like manner, the models 
that postulate mechanical rules for price- and 
wage-fixing do not clearly explain how 
individuals or groups would arrive at these 
decisions, nor how economic policy would react 
to them. Obviously, it is not that the factors that 
cause price increases are totally unknown, but 
that the knowledge is vague. The more erratic 
the inflationary régime or the more sudden the 
changes in economic policy, the greater will be 
the uncertainty (both for the purposes of 
analysis and for decision-taking by the agents). 
It is sometimes possible to identify specific 
circumstances that may step up the rate at which 
prices rise. In this connection, it would appear 
that the marked increase in external debt 
services has created conditions highly propitious 
to inflation. In the first place, the transfers 
abroad imply a higher real exchange rate, which 
tends to be reached by means of nominal 
devaluations which push up prices. Moreover, as 
long as no new structure of relative prices has 
been established (and to some extent accepted), 
the defensive reactions of the sectors most 
affected may give rise to price-fixing 
inconsistencies of the type mentioned. Lastly, as 
a large part of the debt has been contracted or 
taken over by te public sector, an additional 
pressure on the budget is created. When, 
furthermore, taxation capacity is limited (a 
situation which is aggravated by the fall in real 
income), it is to be expected that greater recourse 
will be had to the inflation tax. 
Again, as another example, internal 
financial crises (due in part to real factors or to 
weaknesses in the banking systems) might give 
rise to intense demand for inflation to reduce the 
real value of liabilities. The mechanism by which 
inflation is generated in this case may initially 
imply greater monetary expansion or an 
increase in certain prices. According to where 
the accent is placed, attention will be 
concentrated on these mechanisms or on the 
particular origin of the inflationary pressures. 
This once more illustrates the ambiguity of the 
question concerning the origin of inflation. 
In effect, the eagerness to discover a single . 
explanation may suggest that inflation (above all 
when it is intense) is a more systematic 
phenomenon than it really is. Large fiscal 
deficits, inconsistencies in price-fixing and 
resistance to a reduction in the rate of price and 
wage increases tend to go together and to 
influence one another: once inflation begins to 
soar it seems difficult to assign it a clearly-
defined cause. Something similar happens when 
price variation is considered from one period to 
another. It is frequently observed that the money 
supply increases over and above prices; at other 
times wages take the lead, or the exchange rate, 
or another group of prices; and on some 
occasions prices rise for no apparent reason. 
These sporadic advances or lags do not define 
the type of inflation at each moment in time, but 
reflect the erratic nature of price-fixing. 
An inflationary economy is different from a 
stable economy and not only because the 
nominal variables grow at a greater speed in the 
one case than in the other. The haphazard rise in 
prices, whether because the government can find 
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no means other than a money issue to finance its 
expenditure or because there are irreconcilable 
claims which lead in their turn to a policy of 
accommodation, points to a state of more 
general perturbation. It seems significant that 
many of the major instances of inflations have 
occurred in circumstances of political instability 
or economic crises, that is, when there are 
exacerbated distribution conflicts or when the 
economy is in a condition of manifest 
disequilibrium. In the last instance, an acute 
inflation seems symptomatic of a problem of 
Analysis of the consequences of inflation is 
usually based on models in which inflation is 
neutral (in the sense that the nominal variables 
—prices, wages, money supply— grow at the 
same rate) and completely predictable. Hence 
the main effect of a continuous rise in prices 
would be a distortion in money holdings: the 
higher cost of maintaining assets without 
interest reduces demand for real balances so that 
individuals lessen their consumption of liquidity 
services (Bailey, 1954; Friedman, 1969). 
Attention has also been drawn to the 
distributional implications of unforeseen 
changes in prices (Kessel and Alchian, 1962). 
These effects are by no means negligible, but 
they do not constitute an exhaustive list of the 
consequences of inflation (Leijonhufvud, 1977). 
One of the features of situations of price 
volatility is that the agents are involved in a 
game of complex conjectures, in which they 
possess little reliable information. In such cases 
neither the conduct of the private agents nor 
economic policy is easy to predict. Economic 
policy tends to be influenced by a variety of 
requirements (to sustain the level of activity, to 
maintain external equilibrium, to regulate credit, 
to influence prices, to distribute income or net 
wealth in a particular way), whose priorities vary 
according to the aims of the authorities, the state 
social functioning. From this standpoint, the 
most important consequences of inflation would 
be associated with the difficulties in decision-
taking which characterize a state of great 
uncertainty. In the same way, stabilization 
appears not only as a change in the handling of 
certain policy instruments, but as a process 
which results in modifications of the different 
types of conduct (on the part of both the 
government and the private sector) which 
generate inflation. 
of the economy or the interpretation placed on 
the latter. If policy is unstable it is more probable 
that the expectations of the public will be 
volatile and differ for different individuals,52 a 
factor which affects decisions on prices and asset 
holdings. The diversity of expectations, 
frequently associated with erratic changes in 
public sector prices, is reflected in the haphazard 
evolution of the different categories of prices." 
Then neither the private agents nor the 
government can predict with accuracy the 
behaviour of the markets. This in turn creates 
problems for economic policy. In these 
circumstances there will probably be no clear-cut 
system of policy determination, and private 
decisions will be unsystematic and mutually 
incompatible. The costs of inflation derive not 
only from price increases in themselves but also, 
and mainly, from this disorderliness. 
"Leijonhufvud (1981) distinguishes between well-
constructed expectations, that can be described as based on the past 
conditions of the economy and would be characteristic of relatively 
stable situations, and ill-constructed expectations, which do not 
conform to a well-defined model applied by the agents as a whole. 
iJIt is well established that the variability of relative prices 
increases with inflation (for the Argentinian case, see Heltnan, 
Roiter and Yoguel (1984)). The explanations put forward range 
from structural inflation models to those in which the variation of 
relative prices is a function of the variation in the random 
component of the money supply (Cukierman, 1979). 
II 
Effects of inflation 
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How far inflation disturbs economic activity 
will depend on its intensity. The greater the 
existing instability, the more appreciable will be 
its effects. 
i) The rise in prices stimulates demand for 
liquid assets distinct from the means of payment, 
whose real value rapidly depreciates. One of the 
effects of the flight of money is the increased 
importance acquired by foreign exchange, not 
only as an accounting unit to express prices, but 
also as a means of maintaining purchasing 
power and even making payments. As a 
counterpart to the larger holdings in foreign 
currency (which do not produce interest in the 
country of issue), residents need to dispose of 
goods or other assets, which represents a cost for 
the economy as a whole. Moreover, the attempt 
to reduce the amount of the monetary balances 
diverts resources into short-run financial 
operations and into the quest for methods of 
synchronizing payments and collection, and 
creates difficulties in the organization of trade 
transactions. Besides, not everybody has the 
same facility for avoiding the inflation tax: this 
probably falls mainly on the lower-income 
groups; 
ii) The volatility of prices leads to an active 
quest for information. But despite this effort 
(which withdraws resources from productive 
activities), the agents are faced with much 
greater uncertainty than in conditions of 
stability. They run the risk of incurring heavy 
losses and at the same time have the chance of 
making large profits, which depend solely on the 
forecast of inflation. This generates a boom in 
speculation in which most people find 
themselves induced (or obliged) to take part. 
Many transactions are based entirely on the 
existence of different opinions on future price 
trends: similarly, trade operations are not 
effected which would be carried out in more 
normal circumstances. At the same time, the 
difficulty of making forecasts is all the greater, 
the more extensive is the time horizon of 
decisions. People then prefer to take up flexible 
positions which can be modified as new 
information is received. This may probably lead 
to the postponement of investments which take 
time to produce results. Something similar 
occurs with economic policy: measures aimed at 
promoting growth are less likely to be 
considered lasting when, as happens in cases of 
high inflation, the conduct of the government is 
regarded as unstable; this entails an increase in 
the incentives required to obtain a specific 
response; 
iii) The contraction of the time horizon of 
decisions is more evident in financial markets. 
As uncertainty over prices increases with the 
length of the term, contracts with fixed interest 
are negotiated for short periods. The possible 
options for longer-term financing also have 
their drawbacks: variable interest systems 
involve the risk that the real interest rate will 
change, while the variability of relative prices 
makes it difficult to find appropriate indexes for 
debt adjustment. Hence the provision of funds 
for investment is adversely affected; 
iv) F r e q u e n t p r i ce c h a n g e s quickly 
invalidate the information available to 
consumers. The cost of seeking better buying 
opportunities rises with inflation. Hence price 
competition becomes a less expedient strategy 
for business firms than when conditions are 
more stable; 
v) In preferring flexible measures, the 
agents strive to safeguard themselves against the 
effects of unexpected changes in prices. 
Nevertheless, inflation inevitably produces 
random redistributions of incentives and 
income. Price instability may reflect a 
distribution conflict, but also acts as a feedback to 
it. When systems of automatic wage adjustment 
are applied, their imperfections produce 
unexpected changes in real remunerations and 
thereby constitute a cause of friction; when they 
do not exist, adjustments become more frequent. 
Since it is impossible to set up a well-defined 
system of contracts in real terms and frequent 
and pronounced changes occur in relative prices, 
each round of negotiation becomes a source of 
conflict. 
In situations of erratic inflation, therefore, 
measures directed towards growth and 
permanent income redistribution are relegated 
to a secondary plane in face of a chaotic short-
term game with no precise solution. Given that 
the problem lies in the behaviour pattern of the 
public sector and the private agents, its 
correction implies a change in those lines of 
conduct. In other words, stabilization means the 
achievement of a situation in which the 
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economic actors are in a better position to 
formulate plans for the future and in which it is 
more probable that decisions will be mutually 
compatible. To put it another way, price trends 
should be more predictable; which calls for an 
economic policy such that will guide private 
decision-making towards this end. It will be 
difficult to attain this result with high inflation 
rates. Consequently, one of the conditions for 
1. Stabilization as a problem of 
economic policy 
The designing of stabilization policies poses 
several difficult questions: to what point is it 
d e s i r a b l e and poss ib l e to u n d e r t a k e 
unconditional economic policy commitments; 
what price track is it expedient to choose as a 
goal for stabilization; what does this imply for 
the management of policy instruments; and 
what should be done to ensure that the transition 
to a lower and more stable inflation rate involves 
the least possible cost. 
An initial question relates to the time 
horizon of policies. Economic models tend to 
represent decisions, in relation to time, as the 
solution of problems in which strategies are 
formulated to cover all future periods: the line of 
conduct to be adopted at the present time forms 
part of a sequence of measures and depends on 
the contingencies that are expected to arise in 
time to come. These models are not entirely in 
keeping with reality. In point of fact, the usual 
behaviour pattern is quite different: decisions 
are adopted one by one, without any precise 
definition of future measures. It is natural that 
this should be so, in view of the difficulties of 
ob ta in ing and process ing informat ion . 
Stabilization policies clearly pose a dilemma 
between predetermining (and announcing) the 
evolution of certain instruments throughout a 
stabilization is that the velocity of price increases 
should be "reasonable". To reduce instability it ¡s 
also essential that inflation should be relatively 
predictable, so that the agents can formulate 
fairly trustworthy expectations. The problem of 
stabilization is therefore twofold: to reduce the 
rate of price increases and at the same time to 
ensure that this reduction shall be lasting. 
fairly long period, or allowing a flexible 
adjustment of policies to circumstances. 
Latin America has known what it is to 
embark on numerous programmes that have 
proved impossible to sustain: the alternation of 
attempts at disinflation, crisis and new attempts 
has been a major factor of instability. This 
suggests the undesirability of basing policies 
mainly on temporary expedients, since this may 
affect confidence in their results (and thereby 
hamper the transition towards lower inflation 
rates) and make programmes, once initiated, 
more difficult to keep up. Neither is it probable, 
however, that a stabilization programme can 
propound a complete set of permanent policies. 
On the one hand, if it starts with a situation of 
high inflation, the confusion that this implies 
will preclude the fixing of too extensive a time 
horizon. On the other hand, since stabilization in 
itself represents an appeciable change in the 
economy, it is impossible to make accurate 
forecasts of the conditions that will exist during 
and after the period of transition. From this 
standpoint, it seems reasonable to regard 
stabilization as a preliminary step, frequently 
indispensable but not necessarily definitive, 
towards the establishment of lasting policies. 
Although it is clear that changeable policies 
are very costly, in the longer term a question also 
arises as to the expediency of defining strict rules 
for the management of certain instruments. A 
III 
Stabilization policies 
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case in point is monetary policy. It has been 
proposed that the Central Bank should act in 
such a way as to hold constant the growth rate of 
some monetary aggregate.i4 According to the 
advocates of this system, this monetary 
regulation would solve the problem of price 
instability and at the same time eliminate a large 
part of the fluctuations in aggregate output; if 
the means of payment grow at a predictable rate, 
there will be a reduction in the unforeseen 
component of global demand which, according 
to the traditional hypothesis, causes the cyclical 
changes in production 
These arguments, however, are based on 
very categorical assumptions as to the 
association between money and prices. In actual 
fact, a régime of fixed monetary growth would 
have several disadvantages. To begin with, the 
establishment of the rule in question as part of a 
stabilization programme (and, therefore, 
accompanied by an appreciable change in the 
growth rate of the money supply), may have a 
considerable initial impact on prices, since it will 
presumably increase demand for real balances. 
In these conditions it is almost impossible to 
know what the equilibrium price level would be. 
Thus the regime, instead of facilitating the 
formation of expectations, would be adding a 
further element of uncertainty. After a 
transition, the function of demand for money 
varies according to the changes in the type of 
assets available and the customary forms of 
payment. Even assuming perfect adjustments to 
equilibrium, predetermination of the increase in 
the money supply is not a necessary or sufficient 
condition for making the inflation rate 
predictable. Besides, it does not seem advisable 
to restrict the monetary authorities' capacity for 
action to a point where they cannot apply 
anticyclical measures in the credit markets in 
response to disturbances of real origin.*5 
Thus, although the definition of a more 
predictable monetary system is undoubtedly an 
important part of a stabilization process, it 
*«See Friedman (1959) and Lucas (1980). The general 
argument in favour of policy rules (as against discretionary 
management of the instruments) is developed in Kydland and 
Prescort (1977). 
i5Leijonhufvud (1983 a and b) discusses the problems 
stemming from a monetary system without rules and those which 
would arise in systems without flexibility. 
would not be appropriate to aim at establishing a 
rigid policy rule. In general, there is a dichotomy 
between making policies less predictable, and 
taking the risk of announcing strict 
commitments on the future course of policy 
instruments, which reduce the flexibility of 
policies and may be uncertain of fulfilment. In 
practice, it seems difficult to have unconditional 
rules relating to an indefinite time horizon. Even 
though it might be useful to announce (and 
fulfil) specific objectives in the case of some 
instruments, the stabilization of expectations for 
a fairly prolonged period should probably be 
based on something rather more vague, but at 
the same time simpler: a consensus clearly 
expressed by the government and shared by a 
large part of society, to the effect that price 
volatility is very costly and therefore efforts 
should be made to hold prices to a less uncertain 
course. Rather than a unilateral announcement 
of unchangeable political rules, this would imply 
the existence of an implicit agreement on an 
objective and public confidence (warranted by 
events) that the authorities will endeavour to 
achieve that objective and maintain it. 
At all events, a stabilization policy requires 
that the target set (even though imprecisely) for 
the inflation rate should be attainable with 
reasonable certainty throughout a period that 
stretches beyond the immediate future. To a 
large extent this is a fiscal problem: the inflation 
rate established as a target must be compatible 
with an amount of inflation tax revenue that 
covers the needs of the public sector. It is 
certainly not easy to foresee the future pressures 
that will be exerted on fiscl policy, or the 
evolution of demand for assets. Clearly, 
however, when the aim is to mitigate inflation, it 
is also admitted that a limit must be set to 
financing through money issues: policy should 
therefore aim at making a lower inflation rate 
defensible, taking these restrictions into account. 
That is to say, the fiscal system must find a 
substitute for Central Bank credit and, 
throughout the stabilization process, the income 
redistributions that are effected through the 
budget should be kept in line. The capacity to 
generate tax revenue must correspond to the 
volume of expenditure; among other requisites, 
this presupposes fairly accurate identification of 
the groups that would contribute resources. 
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Moreover, the distribution struggle by way of 
prices should be waged coherently: obviously, 
unless cost variations are accommodated 
through rises in global demand, if one group 
attempts to augment its share of real income 
with a nominal increase, others will suffer a loss. 
In the last resort, stabilization policies 
always involve decisions on distribution: it is a 
matter of replacing redistribution mechanisms 
that create inflationary pressures by others that 
do not produce these effects. As a result, while 
stabilization is not a zero-sum game, in all 
likelihood some groups will be adversely 
affected. This political aspect of stabilization is 
probably one of the most complex, especially if it 
is borne in mind that acute inflation goes hand in 
hand with serious distribution conflicts. In Latin 
America the quest for price stabilization is often 
linked with policies of a conservative type, 
indifferent to income distribution, or producing 
transfers detrimental to the lower-income 
groups. In theory this distributive bias does not 
seem to be a necessary condition of stabilization 
policy. In fact, the latter will be more likely to 
succeed if it can be reconciled with a socially 
acceptable income distribution. 
... 'In the general terms of this discussion, it 
would appear that a programme is the more 
solid, the more clearly defined are the inflation 
targets that are set up and the policies that will 
be applied over a fairly extensive time horizon. 
But these conditions are often difficult to meet. 
And in any case the final result of policies 
depends basically on the handling of the 
transition. This poses two very controversial 
questions: at what speed and with what 
instruments should a stabilization programme 
be tackled. 
2. The transition 
For stabilization to be effective, an indispensable 
requisite is that nominal prices and wages, on 
the one hand, and global demand, on the other, 
should increase at a lower rate. The problem is to 
•define how and at what speed this deceleration 
will take place on reasonably synchronized lines 
and with the least possible disturbance of 
economic activity. The debate on the subject 
usually assumes that the authorities regulate 
demand; hence an attempt is made to learn in 
what way price adjustment will be brought 
about. In traditional analysis the relation 
between prices and quantities is expressed with a 
short-term Phillips curve: prices depend on 
expectations and on excess demand for goods. If 
expectations are based on past inflation or if 
there are contractual (or other) rigidities which 
hinder price variations, a reduction in nominal 
demand will necessarily create a decline in 
activity. The weaker the response of prices to the 
decrease in output and the more abrupt the 
deflation sought, the greater will be the decline. 
This type of argument favours a slowing-down 
of inflation though a gradual policy,56 
particularly through successive reductions in the 
growth rate of the money supply; during this 
process, there would in any case be a period of 
diminished production. 
This view has been questioned by writers 
who use the hypotheses of rational expectations 
and market equilibrium. This line of thought 
assumes that contracts, explicit or implicit, tend 
to be flexible, and adjust themselves to changes 
in economic conditions. Thus there would be no 
curb on price adjustments other than the 
deficiencies of current information. Inflationary 
inertia would disappear if the forecasts of the 
public varied with global demand. In that case, 
stabilization could be rapidly achieved and there 
would be no reason for it to be accompanied by a 
recession. Moreover, the analysis is based on the 
hypothesis that expectations incorporate all 
useful information (in so far as the data are 
available). If inflation ultimately depends on the 
money supply, price forecasts would be based on 
the monetary policy anticipated. Consequently, 
if the government is in a position to create a 
belief that there has been a permanent change in 
the monetary system, of such a kind that global 
demand will be from that moment compatible 
with price stability, expectations and prices 
themselves will be immediately adjusted. 
Monetary expansion must not necessarily be 
curbed abruptly, since the reduced expectations 
of inflation stimulate demand for money. But 
)6On this point authors holding different theoretical 
positions seem to agree. See, for example, Laidler (1975, chap. 4) 
and Gordon (1982). Cagan (1979, page 224) suggests that the best 
possible policy is halfway between a very slow reduction and the 
opposite extreme. 
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there will certainly have to be a visible change in 
fiscal policy: a marked reduction in current 
deficits and especially in those foreseen for the 
future will be essential, to demonstrate beyond 
question that the government will not need to 
have recourse to the inflation tax." 
Aside from the specific details of this debate, 
it seems clear that the choice between gradual or 
shock approaches depends on the initial 
conditions. When inflation is moderate it is 
probable that many relatively long-term 
contracts (in respect of wages or credit) have 
been negotiated in nominal terms and on 
conditions which reflect the growth observed in 
prices. Irrespective of the pace of adjustment of 
expectations, a slow deflation would affect the 
real value of such contracts less than a rapid one. 
Furthermore, gradual policies are potentially 
flexible: they permit the use of information 
progressively obtained in accordance with the 
reaction of the economy. But these possible 
advantages are not equally patent if inflation is 
very high at the start. In these cases the inertia of 
the contracts is less (although it does not 
disappear completely, except perhaps in 
hyperinflations), because the very instability of 
prices leads to a shortening of the periods 
covered by agreements. Furthermore, a 
prolonged transition may signify a lengthy 
period of uncertainty in which the public will 
continue to take ad hoc decisions for want of a 
well-defined longer-term prospect. The very 
flexibility of the measures, moreover, may create 
the impression that they are reversible, which 
would make a change in expectations harder to 
bring about and would increase the pressures on 
policies. 
The shock approach avoids these problems, 
although it imposes strict conditions for 
obtaining good results. Once it has been 
announced that inflation will drop abruptly, it is 
essential that this effect should be produced, that 
the costs of the adjustment will be such as not to 
call in question the viability of the policies and 
that the government should use its instruments 
i?The argument has been developed by Sargent (1981 and 
1982), who bases it on the experience of the European 
hyperinflations, and also by Bomberger and Makinen (1983). 
However, Dornbusch ( 1985) has raised doubts as to whether this 
model is strictly applicable to the case of German inflation in the 
1920s. 
to sustain the stabilization. There is little 
possibility of learning en route, especially in the 
initial stages of the programme: policies must be 
sufficiently well-defined and control over the 
instruments effective; the government, also, 
should perhaps be willing to subordinate some 
of its other objectives to the achievement of a 
lasting effect on prices. This underscores once 
again the need for social consensus on the anti-
inflationary target, but it also implies a marked 
demand for consistency in the policies adopted: a 
shock programme, by its very nature, is difficult 
to reverse and its effectiveness depends in part 
on the public's perception of this fact; the costs 
of failure to obtain the desired results are 
consequently high. But consistency is defined in 
different ways by different theories, whose strict 
validity or invalidity may be in doubt. 
Uncertainty as to the "true model" of the 
economy is particularly important in shock 
strategy; in so far as this is taken into account, it 
is probable that policies may not correspond to a 
scheme that can be exactly fitted into any 
particular theoretical framework. 
At all events, the rational expectations thesis 
brings to the fore several important questions. If 
the determination of the general level of prices 
can be represented as a result of action by the 
government and by private individuals or 
groups, which is influenced by the behaviour 
pattern that each agent hopes the others will 
adopt, one of the keys to stabilization will be that 
the authorities can assume the leadership in the 
game, or, in other words, that they can persuade 
the public to take the policy announced as a 
datum on which to base their decisions. This 
means, in particular, that the government must 
be able to regulate the money supply without 
being harassed by fiscal needs, so that it can 
progressively adjust liquidity in accordance with 
demand for money at a lower inflation rate. The 
more convinced the public is that the 
government has this capacity, the less will be the 
risk that prices will not respond to the policy. 
However, this reasoning does not define the 
whole set of conditions for successful 
stabilization. To begin with, the conditions of 
credibility would need to be determined: when 
can the authorities be assured that their 
announcements will be incorporated into the 
decisions of the public? Although an opinion on 
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this might be given in each specific case, 
credibility is a somewhat vague concept.*8 
Moreover, it does not seem clear that an 
announcement of a radical change in fiscal or 
monetary policy, even though credible, will give 
rise to an appreciable modification of 
expectations and prices.*9 Aside from the 
possible existence of contractual rigidities, there 
remains for the agents the problem of inferring 
prices on the basis of the instruments 
established by the government. 
An announcement on monetary and fiscal 
measures must be interpreted and converted 
into expectations of price variations and these, 
in turn, into decisions on prices and quantities. 
Each firm is interested not only in the behaviour 
pattern that it expects the government to adopt 
but also, and mainly, in what it assumes its 
suppliers and competitors will do and in how 
wages will vary. Uncertainty as to these 
questions does not disappear even though there 
has been a credible change in policy.40 The same 
)8The problem of credibility in relation to stabilization 
policies has been discussed by Schelling (1982) and Koromzay 
(1982). Recently models have been produced in which the public 
gradually modifies its appraisal of the future conduct of the 
government in accordance with the policies actually applied (see, 
for example, Di Tata (1983), Backus and Driffill (1984)). One of 
the findings of these models in which expectations depend on the 
reputation of the authorities is that, even when the latter are 
disposed to slow down nominal demand unconditionally, there is 
some likelihood that expectations might not be adjusted 
immediately: it would not be realized that a change ¡n the policy 
regime had taken place until a recession occurred. 
,yThe credibility of fiscal policy also depends on price 
expectations. When inflation declines, real tax revenue increases, 
because the effect of the lag between the moment of payment and 
the point in time when the tax is imposed diminishes. In other 
words, the fiscal deficit is partly endogenous (see Olivera, 1967; 
Dutton, 1971;Tanzi, 1977; Canavese, 1985). The reduction of the 
fiscal time-lag has been particularly important in hyperinflations. 
It has even been claimed that in some cases stabilization would 
bring with it fiscal equilibrium, rather than vice versa (League of 
Nations, 1946, in relation to the Austrian and Hungarian 
hyperinflations). The interdependence between deficit and 
inflation, on the other hand, introduces an ambiguous situation: a 
fiscal policy credible for a public sceptical towards stabilization 
prospects would imply overadjustment (i.e., would prove highly 
restrictive) once inflation had effectively slowed down. 
40Much of the macroeconomic discussion on the role and 
formation of expectations is based on the contrast between 
adaptive and rational expectations; that is, between forecasts that 
depend solely on the past history of the variable and those in which 
people act as though they knew the process that determines the 
variable. This dichotomy is fallacious. To assume that individuals 
are capable of realizing when a change has taken place in the 
conditions of the economy (and therefore do not mechanically 
extrapolate the past) does not imply the hypothesis that the results 
of the said change are accurately assessed or that the agents make 
uniform predictions on the basis of a given model. 
problem confronts the workers. An abrupt 
change in the inflation rate calls for a 
synchronized movement in prices as a whole. If 
each agent does not clearly perceive that the rest 
will adjust their prices in response to the policy, 
he will have no incentives to make sufficient 
changes in those that he controls.41 In other 
words, even if there is some confidence that the 
government will maintain the course 
announced, there is no guarantee that a sudden 
change in monetary and fiscal policy will be 
wholly reflected in prices.42 It is probable that 
the rate of inflation will not fall at the same pace 
as nominal demand and that the change in 
relative prices will be erratic. The confusion that 
this can produce might endanger the continuity 
of policies. In these conditions inflation may 
possibly not approach the value that would be 
appropriate to an equilibrium response. 
It seems reasonable that a stabilization 
programme should try to avoid these risks. An 
instrument for achieving this is income policy. 
The intervention of the public sector in price-
and wage-fixing is sometimes equivalent to a 
stabilization policy; other opinions regard it as a 
source of unjustified distortions. Neither of 
these two positions seems correct. The function 
of income policy should be to facilitate the 
transition to a lower rate of inflation so that 
prices, taken as a whole, would vary 
approximately in accordance with global 
demand. There is no guarantee that market 
forces by themselves alone will produce this 
result; nor can a policy create a system of prices 
by administrative decision. The efficacy of direct 
measures respecting prices undoubtedly depends 
to a large extent on the conditions and the way ¡n 
which they are applied: 
i) Income policy is complementary to the 
regulation of global demand and does not replace 
it. When controls are applied or price guidelines 
1lDi Tata (1982) and Phelps (1983) have analysed this 
problem by applying the concept of "expectations of 
expectations": people have to foresee in what way the rest will 
make their predictions; if each individual is confident that the rest 
will modify their expectations in face of a policy change, prices will 
move towards equilibrium, but if this is not the case, there will be 
an imbalance. 
^Hyperinflations are special cases: in so far as most prices 
are adjusted ¡n response to a benchmark price (such as the 
exchange rate) it is sufficient for this price to stabilize for all the 
rest to follow (Lopes, 1984). The problem of synchronization 
would not then be so acute as in the case of less rapid inflations. 
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are announced, the public must be confident that 
they will be respected. The administrative 
system may concern itself with specific 
deviations, but cannot exert full control over 
transactions.4J Hence the policy's chances of 
success are dependent on the fact of the 
programme as a whole being regarded as 
feasible. To this end, the government must show 
that it is in a position to prevent immoderate 
demand at the prices indicated. Experience 
shows that the spread of black markets or the 
existence of great discrepancies between 
regulated and non-regulated prices end in the 
last resort with the abandonment of attempts at 
stabilization. To avoid this it is essential that 
those who have to do with pricing should find 
that they will not gain very much by eluding the 
controls: demand should be such as not to create 
disturbances in supplies or stimulate unofficial 
price increases. In other words, the information 
received by market agents should be such as to 
confirm the possibility of sustaining the price 
trend implicit in the programme; 
ii) For this reason, global demand policy has 
a central role in the transition towards a regime 
of lower price increases. Basically, there would 
need to be harmony between expenditure and 
prices, so as not to generate great surpluses or 
insufficiencies of demand. Clearly, however, 
exact harmony in this respect could not be 
achieved, not only because of the well-known 
difficulties in controlling nominal expenditure 
but also because throughout the transition 
period there may be uncertainty as to the 
response of output to a stimulus from demand. 
At all events, the management of specific 
instruments will probably vary according to the 
criterion of those responsible for the policy. In 
particular, if there has been an appreciable 
change in the inflation rate, there will be 
modifications in demand for assets which cannot 
be accurately foreseen. In such cases, it does not 
seem desirable to adopt strict targets for the 
monetary aggregates. In this connection there is 
still the problem of distinguishing the 
movements in the interest rate which are 
attributable to changes in inflation expectations 
43In this regard, it would seem that the management of 
income policies with high inflation rates is extremely complex. 
These policies would therefore be more viable with low inflation 
rates. 
from those which are due to the state of liquidity; 
iii) When prices and wages are regulated the 
economy is being overdetermined: the resulting 
state cannot be described as one of equilibrium. 
Relative prices are not allowed to vary in 
response to market conditions. This is not 
unharmful. But the contention that an income 
policy is undesirable because it produces 
distortions in prices carries little weight. What is 
the alternative? In a state of erratic inflation 
relative prices emerge from a guessing game 
that bears little resemblance to equilibrium; it is 
highly probable that price adjustments in the 
face of a slackening of demand will occur in 
equally haphazard fashion. In these conditions 
relative prices determined by the market will not 
be a useful standard of reference. The 
stabilization of prices as a whole seems to be a 
requisite for embarking on the formation of a 
coherent price system; the ini t ial 
overdetermination is then a way of accelerating 
the process which leads to this. 
In any case, the constraints imposed by price 
control on the movements of relative prices can 
present a problem for anti-inflationary policies 
if demand for some goods is in great excess or if 
some groups consider that they are carrying a 
disproportionate load. It is almost inevitable 
that some such cases will arise, without 
necessarily jeopardizing the policy as a whole. It 
is important, however, that lags should not occur 
that lead at any time to heavy increases in some 
nominal prices. This means, on the one hand, 
that strict control over prices should have a 
limited duration, until such time as there can be 
confidence in the incorporation of the lower 
inflation rate into decisions on prices. On the 
other hand, it is important that the point of 
departure for relative prices, especially those of 
greater macroeconomic significance (real 
exchange rate, real wages, public sector prices) 
should be such as to avoid major imbalances. 
This is a particularly complex aspect, especially 
when the initial situation makes it difficult to 
apply historical norms as a frame of reference 
and when there are sharp conflicts over income 
distribution. Nonetheless, this fact must be 
faced: it would once again be Utopian to imagine 
that the quest for an acceptable set of relative 
prices will not suffer disturbances in a climate of 
high inflation. 
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In any event, at some time or other relative 
prices must change and this will imply upward 
movements in some nominal values. It also 
seems certain that the application of an income 
policy may create uncertainty as to the possibility 
of maintaining low inflation rates, especially 
when there has been previous experience of 
abrupt price increases when the controls are 
removed. This underlines the need for a demand 
policy compatible with the price track chosen, so 
as to create confidence that the above effect will 
not be produced. The learning process may also 
take place in the reverse direction: if for a time 
the managed prices are maintained without 
appreciable upsets, expectations will be 
reinforced: if this happens, the adjustments 
required in relative prices will not necessarily 
imply a major upswing in nominal prices as a 
whole. In addition, it is likely that with an 
interval of relatively stable prices, the demands 
made on each individual firm will become more 
elastic, since, when prices are less volatile, it 
costs purchasers less to look for what they want. 
This, if the firms perceive it, may become an 
incentive for keener competition in respect of 
prices. 
The application of an income policy in 
conjunction with demand policies is intended to 
reduce the negative effect of stabilization on 
activity. It is difficult, however, for disturbances 
to be avoided entirely. In so far as expectations 
are not rapidly and completely adjusted, the real 
interest rate may rise, as frequently happens on 
the inception of stabilization programmes. 
Additionally, it is possible, especially when rapid 
The preceding sections were focused on inflation 
from an analytical standpoint. Although ¡n 
dealing with this subject it is impossible not to 
refer, albeit implicitly, to actual situations (and 
the foregoing exposition was perhaps influenced 
deflation is the aim, that a preíod may ensue in 
which uncertainty as to prices will cause a 
contraction of supply. Besides, both from the 
fiscal point of view and from that of relative 
prices, an anti-inflationary policy is necessarily 
non-neutral: there will be sectors whose real 
income is reduced, and, even if others improve 
their position (especially those that were most 
affected by the inflation tax), the effects on 
expenditure may not be totally and immediately 
offset. At the same time stabilization can bring 
to light losses which certain individuals or 
sectors were incurring, but which they did not 
clearly perceive or which they were hoping to 
recoup at some time or other. Over a longer 
term, some activities whose profits were linked 
with price instability, or which were organized 
in relation to this, would also have reason to 
contract. 
When starting with high inflation, 
therefore, the transition to a more stable 
economy can hardly take place without some 
distortions. In the conditions facing many Latin 
American economies, the reduction of inflation 
is particularly difficult becuse of the burden of 
external debt weighing upon real income and the 
budget. Moreover, an economy with high 
inflation cannot function with.a reasonable 
degree of co-ordination. Without some price 
stability there is little room for policies aiming at 
the growth and orderly redistribution of income. 
Basically, stabilization would be an attempt to 
enable such policies to be implemented; in the 
longer run, stabilization depends on them for its 
preservation. 
by the Argentinian experience), the discussion 
was kept on a general plane. The present section 
has a different purpose in view: namely, to 
comment on a specific stabilization programme 
with its own particular features. The interest of 
IV 
A stabilization policy based on shock: 
The case of the Plan Austral 
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the Plan Austral applied in Argentina derives, 
on the one hand, from the magnitude of the 
inflation which gave rise to the programme 
(around 1 % per day) and, on the other, from the 
set of instruments used to curb it to an abrupt 
halt. Our intention here is to describe the 
conditions that carried inflation to extremely 
high levels, to comment on the content of the 
programme and to mention some of its initial 
effects.44 
Argentina has a long tradition of inflation. It 
is not that there have been no efforts at 
stabilization. Indeed, since the 1950s a variety of 
policies for moderating inflation have been put 
into effect. These experiments were of different 
types, according to the characteristics of the 
governments that tried them out and also in 
relation to the theories in vogue on each 
occasion. The programmes included restrictions 
on demand of the conventional type (in 1959 and 
during a brief episode in 1977/1978), income 
policies (in the form of a generalized freeze in 
1952 and 1973; freezing of wages and pegging of 
the exchange rate with a voluntary price 
agreement in 1967; a brief truce on prices in 
1977) and, more recently, in 1978-1981, a 
"crawling-peg" policy (based on pre-
announcement of the exchange rate with a 
decreasing devaluation). These programmes, 
however, had no lasting effects, although in 
some cases there were temporary (sometimes 
marked) decreases in the rate of inflation. 
The recurrence of experiments in 
stabilization, the breakdown of policies and new 
attempts, have had various consequences. To 
begin with, the repetition of the sequence 
implied serious instability in policies. This 
volatility, besides, has been incorporated into 
expectations; in Argentina, there is less public 
confidence in policies than in countries with a 
less turbulent economic history, all the more so 
since the previous programmes have already 
tried out a wide variety of potential stabilization 
instruments. Nevertheless, the costs of inflation 
are widely recognized. Hence there is a pressing 
"
4The description given here of the economic evolution of 
Argentina in recent years and in the initial months of the 
application of the programme is qualitative and very brief. More 
detailed descriptions can be found in ECXAC (1980 to 1984) and in 
one of the essays contained in ECI.AC (1986). 
demand for stabilization and at the same time 
great obstacles in the way of its achievement. 
The inflation rate in Argentina has been 
exceptionally high in recent years, even in 
relation to the country's customary levels. Since 
1974 the velocity of price increases has never 
been less than 100% annually in any year (with a 
brief exception in 1980); in the last five-year 
period, there has been a persistent acceleration, 
culminating in inflation rates in the order of 
30% per month or even higher by mid-1985. 
This rapid upswing was associated with the 
profound crisis which derived from the failure of 
the economic liberalization programme and the 
pre-announced exchange rate. 
Towards the end of 1980 the real exchange 
rate was abnormally low; although the rise in 
domestic prices was less rapid it was far from 
approaching parity in purchasing power. At the 
same time, the external debt had increased 
appreciably, The public sector in particular had 
contracted heavy debts in foreign exchange, 
which financed the current account deficit and a 
rapid outflow of private capital (although part of 
the private sector had also increased its 
indebtedness). The activity of the sectors 
producing tradeable goods had already begun to 
diminish, mainly owing to competition from 
imported goods. The domestic financial system, 
which had greatly expanded in the preceding 
years, was experiencing serious difficulties 
because of the irregular recovery of credits. 
Furthermore, it was predictable that social 
tensions would become more acute, despite the 
fact that real wages had partly recovered after 
the sharp fall recorded in 1976-1978. 
The state of the economy involved a very 
marked inflationary potential. Devaluation, 
which was inevitable in view of the balance-of-
payments situation, was bound to be reflected in 
domestic prices, not only because of its direct 
impact, but also through the secondary 
repercussions typical of an economy adjusted to 
inflation. An increase in the real exchange rate, 
on the other hand, would have a direct effect on 
public finances (by raising the real value of debt 
services) and would also generate pressures for 
subsidized transfer of the private debt to the 
public sector. At the same time, the high level of 
domestic indebtedness was creating demands for 
a reduction in the financial burdens of 
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enterprises, either through subsidies or through 
increased inflation. 
In this way, successive spurts of inflation 
were produced as government measures went on 
being adjusted, in a climate of great political and 
economic instability, to the accumulating 
pressures. In the course of 1981 the exchange 
rate rose five times, without any appreciable 
improvement in the external payments 
situation: there was no halt in the fall of reserves 
and the debt, especially that of the public sector 
continued to rocket. At the end of the Falkland 
Islands conflict, midway through 1982, it was 
decided to introduce a new and heavy 
devaluation and a reform in the financial system 
aimed at improving the debtors' situation. 
Among the chief measures of this reform was 
the decision to extend the deadlines for the 
repayment of bank credits and the Central Bank 
took over the fixing of the interest rate in the 
most important segment of loans and deposits. 
As this rate was far below anticipated inflation, 
there was an abrupt fall in demand for liquid 
assets, which had repercussions on the goods 
markets. This produced a "watering-down" of 
debts (which continued in the following years), 
at the cost of a new increase in the rate of 
inflation. 
Throughout this period several events 
combined to augment the fiscal deficit. In the 
first place, the servicing of the public external 
debt shot up (from less than 1% of the GDP in 
1980 to over 6% in 1982), not only as a result of 
the increased indebtedness of the government 
itself and the high interest rates, but also because 
the public sector was gradually assuming 
responsibility for the private debt. Although the 
measures adopted in 1982 included the 
redeeming of domestic government securities in 
the hands of the public (particularly Treasury 
bills and adjustable bonds), the financial reform 
led to a significant increase in interest-bearing 
bank reserves, which created large cash deficits 
for the Central Bank (or "quasi-fiscal deficits", as 
they were generally called in Argentina). 
Moreover, the drop in activity (which reached its 
lowest ebb in mid-1982) and the rapid price 
increases themselves reduced tax revenue; the 
decline amounted to over 5% of the GDP in two 
years. In other words, both the absorption by the 
government of potential capital losses in the 
private sector and the burden of external interest 
payments plus the existing recessive and 
inflationary conditions combined to debilitate 
the public finances. In this situation the 
author i t ies had progressively increasing 
recourse to Central Bank credit. At the same 
time demand for money was appreciably 
declining. Thus the need for inflation tax 
revenue was growing, while the tax base was 
contracting. 
In 1983 inflation soared still higher, until it 
reached an average of 17% per month in the last 
quarter. This was a confused process, influenced 
by the joint effect of an extremely large fiscal 
deficit (public sector financing by the Central 
Bank and the variation in short-term liabilities 
exceeded 17 % of the GDP), heavy wage 
pressures and the government's attempt to 
maintain the real value of the exchange rate and 
of public service charges. This peiod saw an 
intensification of the instability of economic 
policy. The military government was now 
seriously weakened, and the chief aim of its 
economic management was to absorb the 
different pressures until the time of the elections 
fixed for the month of October. Thus, in a 
climate of great turbulence, the constitutional 
authorities took over the government at the end 
of 1983. 
At that time there was a variety of demands 
requiring attention. Following the external crisis 
of 1980 (aggravated by the burden of interest on 
the debt, the interruption of credit flows and the 
fall in export prices) the economy had carried 
out a radical adjustment, although with special 
characteristics. Between 1980 and 1983 imports 
of goods shrank to less than half, so that an 
appreciable surplus was generated on the trade 
balance. This adjustment affected domestic 
production, although as from 1982 there had 
been a marked revival of import substitution, 
which contributed to the recovery of industrial 
output after a slump. From the standpoint of 
expenditure, the most significant event was the 
sharp drop in investment: not only was 
financing scarce, but also the investment spirit 
was depressed. The flight of capital in the early 
1980s had apparently reflected not only a short-
term speculation movement, but a widespread 
lack of confidence in the future of the economy. 
This, coupled with the magnitude and urgency of 
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debt commitments, severely restricted growth. 
In addition, there were pronounced social 
tensions: practically all groups were claiming 
improvements in their income. At the same 
time, inflation had soared, and its costs were 
manifest, but it was equally clear that it would be 
difficult to control the fiscal deficit and moderate 
the distribution struggle which was finding 
expression through the price system. 
Initially, the government attempted to 
reconcile an increase in output and in real wages 
with a gradual slackening of inflation, while 
negotiations with the external creditors were 
attempted. A policy of reduction of the fiscal 
deficit was announced, based on the contraction 
of expenditure on defence and security and 
greater efficiency in tax administration. At the 
outset, however, anti-inflationary policy 
consisted mainly of the establishment of 
monthly guidelines for the main prices 
(exchange rate, wages, public service charges, 
industrial prices, regulated interest rate), in an 
attempt to influence costs and expectations. This 
policy turned out to be ineffectual: inflation 
overstepped the guidelines set, with the result 
that there was a maladjustment between the 
prices regulated by the authorities and those that 
were not controlled. 
Throughout the year the authorities showed 
increasing concern for the control of global 
demand. This was reflected in a reduction in the 
government's current expenditure on non-
personal goods and services and in a fall in public 
investment, although, as counterpart, the 
hoped-for increase in tax revenue did not 
materialize. There was also a change in price and 
wage policy: whereas the wage guidelines 
(whose application was limited more and more 
to the public sector) became more restrictive, the 
government tried to restore the real value of the 
exchange rate and the prices of public services. 
Towards the end of 1984, moreover, after the 
signing of a stand-by credit agreement with the 
IMF, there was a hardening of monetary policy. 
In short, output and real wages increased in 
1984, and at the same time a significant surplus 
was achieved in foreign trade, while progress 
was m a d e in e x t e r n a l n e g o t i a t i o n s . 
Nevertheless, towards the end of the period 
there were visible signs of an interruption in real 
expansion. Additionally, the rate at which prices 
rose showed no tendency to decrease. Inflation 
rates remained in the region of 20% per month 
and most of the public probably expected an 
acceleration to even higher rates. 
The policy of gradual adjustment applied in 
1984 did not succeed in producing a 
simultaneous slowdown in costs, global demand 
and expectations in such a way as to have a 
definite effect on prices. Although the intention 
was to curb price increases, no change had been 
produced in the inflationary régime. Income and 
demand policies, acting separately and with 
differing intensity according to the point in time, 
had not shown themselves effective in guiding 
prices. Price resistance was accentuated by the 
apparent reversibility of the policies and by the 
generalized (although imperfect) indexation. 
Both through its impact on public finances 
(owing to the fiscal lag and the operational 
losses of the Central Bank) and through the price 
and wage adjustment mechanisms to which it 
conduced, inflation tended to persist or gather 
speed, especially when rises occurred in basic 
relative prices: meat, the exchange rate, public 
service charges. This in turn stepped up the 
probable costs of the anti-inflationary measures 
and detracted from their credibility; the situation 
thus assumed the characteristics of a sort of 
vicious circle. Moreover, the effects of the 
extremely high inflation were patent: there was 
an obvious spread of speculative behaviour 
associated with price volatility. Hence an effort 
at stabilization became a matter of urgency. 
The experience of high inflation produced 
considerable changes in wage- and price-setting 
procedures and in debt contracts. These were 
particularly evident in the shortening of the 
periods between decisions. In recent years, 
public service charges and wages were adjusted 
every month.'45 Wage indexation based on the 
price increases of the previous month was 
4iFrenkel ( 1984 a) found evidence that wage increases were 
applied quarterly up to 1982. With the upsurge of inflation the 
adjustment period was reduced to a month. It should be noted, 
however, that the payment period for wages and salaries (monthly 
for employees, almost invariably fortnightly for manual workers) 
remained in general unchanged in relation to what it had been in 
periods when inflation was much lower. As wage-earners in 
general had probably little access to the use of money substitutes, 
this situation tended to maintain demand for money. It may be 
conjectured that, if inflation had continued at rates in the region of 
1 % per day, payment practices would have been modified, which 
would have still further accentuated the rejection of money. 
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probably a current practice; it is difficult, 
however, to be precise about how widely and 
how systematically this rule was applied. Little is 
known about price formation in the private 
sector, apart from the fact that, towards the 
middle of 1985, increases were taking place 
several times a month. Probably decisions on 
prices stemmed from complex and somewhat 
irregular process which, besides the transfer 
(more or less automatic) of current costs, were 
also influenced by the conjectures that each firm 
formed as to the future evolution of the prices of 
its inputs and its demand. Prices reflected the 
headlong course of inflationary instability. In 
contrast to what occured in the European 
hyperinflations, no generally accepted referent 
(such as the value of foreign exchange) had been 
established for pricing purposes. All this implied 
that, although price and wage adjustments had 
tended to synchronize, the factors of inflationary 
inertia had not entirely disappeared; nor was it 
possible to identify a single basic variable 
capable of guiding the price system in such a way 
as to break the inflationary trend. 
The credit markets also concentrated on very 
short-term operations. In general financial 
operations were carried out with payment terms 
of only a few days and at interest rates that 
reflected average expectations of the variation in 
prices. For contracts of a certain duration (such 
as leases), different indexation clauses were 
used. Apparently the practice of monthly 
adjustments had become general, price,indexes 
for the preceding month being applied. In other 
words, in most credit contracts, price 
fluctuations were rapidly, but not immediately, 
incorporated. 
These conditions were propitious for abrupt 
deflation, since there were no major lags in 
prices adjustments and in contracts. 
Nonetheless, in order to achieve a marked fall in 
the inflation rate a system had to be defined to 
tackle the elements of inertia that were still 
present and thus to bring about a very rapid 
change in the behaviour of the public, as well as 
to influence public finance. 
At some point early in 1985, the government 
would seem to have begun to consider a shock 
stabilization policy. One of the main features of 
this programme was an attempt at the 
simultaneous control of all the potential 
elements of inflation. From this standpoint, the 
stabilization plan was consistent with a variety 
of hypotheses on the sources of price increases 
and, according to many of these hypotheses, 
some of its instruments would prove redundant. 
In this way, the government was probably 
attempting to diminish the risks of not attaining 
a definite result, which would have saddled it 
with very heavy costs. 
The authorities' analysis, expressed in the 
speeches that accompanied the announcement 
of the programme injune 1985, was based on the 
experience of earlier attempts at stabilization. 
The government discarded the possibility of a 
new attempt at gradual deflation, since it 
deemed the prolonged maintenance of inflation 
rates of the current magnitude unacceptable. It 
also rejected the unilateral employment of price 
and wage policies: if these were not harmonized 
with global demand, the result would sooner or 
later be chaos in the price system. According to 
this same analysis, therefore, there had to be a 
visible change in fiscal and monetary policy, not 
only to ensure that global demand would be 
adjusted to much less rapid changes in prices, but 
also to guide the expectations of an important 
group of the public. This last objective made it 
desirable for the government to explicitly 
announce that there would be a modification in 
the handling of policies. But it was also thought 
that the announcement would not suffice: if the 
inertia of prices were not overcome and if it were 
not clearly shown that these would effectively 
cease to rise, there was a risk of a feeble initial 
response which would jeopardize the fulfilment 
of the fiscal and the monetary announcements 
(given that the fiscal lag would continue in 
operation), and the recession would be 
intensified. To income policy was assigned the 
role of calling an abrupt and simultaneous halt to 
the growth of costs and prices in a manner 
sufficiently definite for it to be incorporated into 
expectations. Finally, in view of the proposal to 
cut inflation short, it was necessary to foresee the 
possible redistributions that would occur with 
the sudden transformation of high nominal 
interest rates on operations already agreed upon 
into equally high rates, or with the use of 
indexations based on former inflation for the 
adjustment of payments after the brake had been 
applied to prices. The programme included a 
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system of debt conversion (from the old currency 
to a new one) which, in effect, functioned by 
translating into terms of nominal values, 
decreasing over time, the deterioration in the 
purchasing power of future payments that would 
have resulted from a rise in prices such as had 
been taking place before the programme. This 
mechanism sought to neutralize the effect of the 
sudden change ¡n the price trend on payment 
commitments previously contracted. 
In the months before the announcement of 
the programme, the government devoted special 
attention to improving the fiscal situation and 
increasing the real values of public service 
charges and the exchange rate. There was also a 
rapid liberalization of industrial prices, and 
stimulus was given to the recovery of the price of 
beef cattle, which had lagged appreciably behind. 
These policies, which aimed at establishing 
sustainable values for the main relative prices, 
implied an acceleration of the growth of prices 
and also had repercussions on activity and real 
wages (especially in the public sector). Since 
there were few signs of an imminent 
stabilization programme, inflationary 
expectations probably soared in a climate of 
acute tension. This became critical in the 
fortnight of June, when an unexpected rise 
occurred in the price of fuels, a devaluation was 
announced (with mainly fiscal aims, since it was 
combined with new foreign trade taxes) and 
rumours (often inaccurate) circulated on the 
content of the plan. 
The programme was promulgated on 14 
June, in a manner which clearly conveyed that 
the government had adopted it as an "all or 
nothing" option. A sharp reduction was 
announced for the fiscal deficit forecast for the 
second half of the year;46 this would enable the 
Treasury to cease asking for Central Bank 
credits. In other words, there was a suspension of 
government financing through money issues;47 
46Perhaps the magnitude of the fiscal adjustment envisaged 
in the programme can be better appreciated if it is borne in mind 
that, discounting interest payments on the external debt, the 
projection implied an excess of income over expenditure. 
'''Before the announcement, the Central Bank had granted 
large amunts of credit to the government, which were used to form 
a financial buffer, assigned in part to the payment of thejune half-
bonus in the Civil Service. The use of an initial money issue to 
finance a temporary imbalance in the government accounts was a 
general practice in the programmes combating the hyperinflations 
of the 1920s. 
this commitment was to be of indefinite 
duration. At the same time it was decided to 
institute a general freeze of prices, wages, the 
exchange rate and public service charges. Prices 
would be frozen at their 12 June values (which 
implied that the numerous price increases 
applied in the days just before the 
announcement would not be confirmed); wages 
would be fixed after the increase in 
remunerations for the month of May which was 
due under the indexation rule previously 
applied. The freezing would be temporary, but 
its duration was not fixed. The interest rate on 
deposits in the regulated segment was 
established at 4% per month; i.e., at a much 
highr value than the inflation rate implicit in the 
freeze, but much lower than the rate of 28% per 
month previously in force. Lastly, the creation of 
a new monetary unit (the austral) was 
announced: money in circulation and demand 
deposits would be automatically converted in the 
proportion of one austral per thousand pesos; 
debts fixed in pesos (or adjustable according to 
indexes which reflected the inflation in pesos 
prior to the reform) would be paid according to 
the application of a conversion scale which 
implied a daily depreciation of the peso in 
relation to the austral. 
The features of the stabilization programme 
required an abrupt change in the attitude of the 
public. Actually, although the initial reaction of 
the principal social groups was one of caution, or 
opposition, there was a notable turnaround in 
the expectations of the public in general. It is 
difficult to distinguish the part played in this by 
the specific announcements (such as the 
monetary-fiscal commitment or the freeze) but 
it was undoubtedly influenced by the fact that the 
programme showed a clear determination on the 
part of the authorities to use their instruments to 
bring down inflation; the reaction of the public 
revealed that there was a strong desire for 
stability. This does not mean that expectations 
were immediately adjusted to a zero increase in 
prices, but it does show that a spell of marking 
time was introduced during which the possibility 
of a hyperinflationary explosion could be 
discounted. For the moment, this attitude 
showed itself in a keen price hunt on the part of 
consumers, in a widespread renewal of bank 
deposits at much lower interest rates than some 
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days earlier, and in a fall in the parallel exchange 
rate. 
At the outset the application of the price 
freeze ran into certain difficulties: for some 
weeks there was uncertainty as to the prices of 
many products. This had a disturbing effect on 
transactions and (together with the contraction 
of consumer demand) was probably one of the 
causes of the sharp fall in activity during the 
months of June and July. Following this, a very 
marked attenuation was observed in price 
increases, and the markets, with certain 
exceptions, functioned normally. The wholesale 
price index rose by less than 1% per month 
between July and November. Consumer prices 
varied more rapidly (around 2.5% per month on 
average, eliminating the after-effect of the 
substantial increases in the first part of June on 
the indexes of the following months), owing to 
the rise in the prices of services and of some 
primary commodities. In point of fact, there 
seems to have been a certain slide in prices (and 
in wages); at all events, the downturn in 
inflation was abrupt and well-defined. 
The reduction in the fiscal deficit was due to 
several causes. In the first place, in the months 
before the programme there was a marked 
upswing in the real value of public service 
charges. Moreover, the fall in the inflation rate 
itself eliminated much of the effect of the fiscal 
lag, so that there was a notable increase in tax 
revenue. The cash income of the government 
also increased, thanks to the larger taxes on 
foreign trade and the application of a forced loan 
(linked with the 1984 taxable income and net 
wealth). Secondly, public-sector wages and 
salaries remained lower than in the previous 
year, and investment expenditure was reduced. 
As a result, the central government Treasury 
achieved an approximate balance between 
outgoings and income and was able to abstain 
from requesting Central Bank credits, The 
adjustment was less marked in the provinces and 
in the State enterprises. Thus the fall in the 
public-sector deficit as a whole, although 
striking, was apparently somewhat lower than 
had been predicted. 
The creation of money slowed down 
markedly in the last part of 1985, although much 
less than prices, Monetary expansion was fed by 
the accumulation of reserves (owing to the 
surplus on the trade balance and the inflow of 
capital, encouraged by the great difference 
between the domestic interest rate and the zero 
variation in the exchange rate), the rediscounts 
to the financial system and Central Bank 
payments on the reserves; creation of money via 
these sources was partly sterilized (at a high cost 
for the Central Bank) through increases in cash 
requirements. There were significant changes in 
the portfolios of financial assets: demand for 
means of payment and interest-earning deposits 
increased, alongside a reduction in deposits 
adjustable in accordance with price indexes, 
while the parallel exchange rate (with some 
fluctuations) maintained a stable trend. This was 
apparently a reflection of the brusque change in 
inflat ionary expecta t ions . Non- regu la ted 
interest rates, however, varied above 5% a 
month; this suggests that, after some months, 
c o n s i d e r a b l e i n f l a t i ona ry e x p e c t a t i o n s 
persisted.48 
Once the initial maladjustment was over, 
there was a certain recovery in global demand. 
Although the level of activity towards the end of 
1985 remained far below previous maximum 
levels, an increase in production was observable 
in relation to the meagre figures recorded injune 
and July of that year, and stocks were relatively 
normal. Thus the decline in the number of hours 
worked and in employment was halted. With 
regard to real wages, a comparison between 
periods with very different price increase rates is 
difficult, since in conditions of high inflation the 
purchasing power of a given nominal income is 
critically dependent on the point in time when it 
is received and on the time profile of its 
e x p e n d i t u r e . In g e n e r a l t e r m s , real 
remunerations seem to have declined slightly 
since the beginning of the programme; at the 
end of 1985 they were below the values 
corresponding to the previous year (especially in 
the public sector), although they exceeded the 
minimum levels recorded at the beginning of the 
decade. 
'"'Of course the level of the interest rate may have had other 
causes: one of the problems posed by the state of the economy was 
to identify how far the ex unte real interest rates were as high as 
appeared from the comparison of the nominal rates with the 
effective rise in prices. Moreover, the high costs of financial 
intermediation implied very wide margins between the rates on 
deposits and on loans, and thus increased the price of credit, 
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It would be premature to attempt a precise 
appraisal of the results of the programme.A9 
Nevertheless , it evidently produced an 
apppreciable fall in the rate of inflation, at a 
relatively low cost in terms of production losses 
in the wake of the abrupt change. Moreover, 
some months after the announcement of the 
programme, signs were observable —still 
inc ip ient (because uncer ta in ty has not 
disappeared), but significant—of a modification 
in economic behaviour: consumers could take 
advantage of the greater facility of comparing 
prices, there was a certain increase in consumer 
credit and, apparently, firms were devoting 
more attention to the calculation of their costs. 
Generally speaking, the time horizon for 
decisions seemed to have extended beyond the 
few weeks that represented the foreseeable 
future during the period of great inflation. 
S o m e q u e s t i o n s na tu ra l ly r e m a i n 
unanswered: to what extent will the low 
inflation rates be sustainable, and what can be 
expected of the performance of the economy in 
the new conditions? The aim of the stabilization 
programme was to control a situation of 
emrgency. As such, it had some components that 
were of a temporary character. Teh freezing of 
prices and wages was useful in cutting short the 
inertia of prices and giving a frame of reference 
to expectations. As the memory of inflation 
could not be blotted out in a few months, it will 
probably still be necessary to give income-policy 
guidelines for the orientation of price formation. 
At the same time, a prolonged freeze (even as it 
was used, without rigid application) inhibits the 
movements of relative prices and, in the light of 
the country's previous experience, may also 
create unfavourable expectations. Hence it 
would seem necessary to define rules for income 
policy which will allow the time horizon of the 
programme to be extended without the rigidity 
of a freeze. It is probable that upon this may 
partly depend the reduction of interest rates, 
which still remained very high towards the end 
of 1985. Similarly, it appears important that the 
government should be able to demonstrate its 
capacity to maintain, on a more permanent basis, 
a smaller fiscal deficit. 
4yThis document was completed in December 1985. 
Both from the fiscal point of view and from 
the price and wages angle questions of 
distribution arise. The incipient stabilization has 
enabled the economy to develop in a more 
rational manner: even so, this in itself does not 
imply that the crisis has been overcome. 
Predictably, an economy that had reached the 
brink of hyperinflation will find recovery 
difficult. In Argentina's present circumstances, it 
is to be expected that there will still be heavy 
unsatisfied demands for higher wages, bigger 
profit margins and transfers through the budget. 
The stabilization programme involved a radical 
change in the way in which economic decisions 
are made: the government took the initiative in 
formalizing its announcements, a proceeding 
which was implictly accepted by the other actors. 
This may have been due to the seriousness of'the 
state of the econony and probably also to the 
government's effort to distribute the costs (and 
the benefits) of stabilization. Indubitably, 
however, some sectors have suffered losses. In 
the long run, the social groups will not abandon 
their claims: the problem still lies in achieving a 
smooth evolution of the distribution struggle, 
without successive sectoral thrusts that generate 
inflation. In this connection, the threat of a 
return to high inflation may serve to moderate 
the conflict, if this takes place in a framework in 
which the actors clearly perceive the limits 
imposed on the improvement of their incomes 
by the conditions of the economy and the 
resistance of the rest. At the same time, a state of 
stagnation fosters the distribution conflict: there 
will be fewer obstacles to the achievement of 
stabilization, the more clearly it is recognized 
that a trend towards growth can be regained. 
Much depends, of course, on the behaviour 
of the domestic agents, both public and private. 
But the economy is also subject to a pronounced 
external constraint. Payments on the debt 
(combined at present with an abrupt 
deterioration of the terms of trade) impose 
severe pressure on public sector finances and 
reduce national income; both these elements 
hamper stabilization. Although the anti-
inflationary programme was the offspring of the 
costs that price instability imposed on the 
domestic economy, one of its consequences has 
been an improvement in external bargaining 
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capacity. Nonetheless, the problem posed by the 
debt continues to be extremely complex and to 
some extent transcends the sphere of 
negotiation between the country and its 
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